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The business environment is more uncertain and ambiguous than ever. Learning and 
adaptation in such environment is critical for organizational survival and prosperity. 
This dissertation, with three essays, investigates how organizations can effectively 
learn and adapt under uncertainty and ambiguity. 
The first essay addresses the question about how high and moderate aspiration levels 
compare in terms of affecting the decision making and reinforcement learning in an 
uncertain environment. After developing a thought experiment and a computational 
model, I used lab experiments to test the model’s predictions: a high (moderate) 
aspiration level reduces (increases) feedback ambiguity about the relative attractiveness 
of different options, thus increases the exploitation (exploration) tendency of the 
decision maker. The behavioural difference suggests that high aspirations lead to better 
performance in stable environments, but worse performance after disruptive shocks. 
The second essay investigates whether organizations should commit more (or less) to 
exploration in response to an increased environmental dynamism. Using a 
computational model, I address the literature contradictions by disentangle exploration 
intensity and width. I demonstrate that the phenomenon of “chasing a moving target” 
(Posen & Levinthal, 2012) – the decreasing optimal exploration level under increased 
environmental dynamism – is caused by the entanglement of exploration intensity and 
width. 
The third essay addresses the question about how ambiguous performance feedback 
across organizational levels affects resource allocation. Attribution theory suggests 
organizations and organizational members will attribute success internally while 
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attributing failures externally, resulting different learning and response patterns 
following organizational success and failure. Using professional basketball data, I 
demonstrate the resources (minutes) allocated to players are subject to the players prior 
performance. Team performance (game win) positively moderates the relationship 
between allocated resource and a player’s performance. The moderating effect is the 
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ESSAY A: Aspiration levels, and exploration: an adaptive learning approach 
Introduction 
Since March (1991) introduced the exploration–exploitation trade-off to 
organizational theory and strategy, a central concern in the literature on 
organizational search has been how companies can strike a balance between 
exploiting existing competencies and exploring new opportunities. In the last two 
decades, a substantial theoretical and empirical literature has studied how 
organizations balance the conflicting demands of exploration and exploitation – for 
example, in the context of ambidexterity (for a review, see O’Reilly and Tushman, 
2013; for a meta-analysis, see Junni et al., 2013) or problemistic search and 
organizational adaptation (see reviews by Baumann, Schmidt, and Stieglitz, 2019; 
Posen et al., 2018). One focus in this literature is on understanding how the 
aspiration-performance gap affects an organization’s choice between these two 
activities (for reviews, see Bromiley and Rau, 2019; Greve and Gaba, 2017; Shinkle, 
2012). 
At the organization level of analysis, there is broad agreement that 
performance below aspirations triggers search away from the status quo, or 
exploration. In contrast, performance at or above the aspiration level triggers narrow 
search that reinforces the status quo – that is, exploitation (Cyert and March, 1963). 
However, March (1991) framed the trade-off differently: as a process of allocating 
resources among uncertain alternatives. Viewed in this way, there is no specific status 
quo for the manager to abandon; hence the trade-off between exploration and 
exploitation is modeled as a problem of learning (under uncertainty) about the 
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relative attractiveness of options and not as a problem of broad versus narrow search 
(see Billinger et al., 2019; Denrell, 2003; Denrell and Fang, 2010; Denrell and March, 
2001). we know much less about how managers’ aspiration levels affect exploration–
exploitation choices in this “learning and choice” scenario than in the traditional 
search scenario. 
Learning under uncertainty is a ubiquitous problem in organizations. At the 
corporate level, managers need to decide how to reallocate resources from cash cow 
businesses among relatively uncertain options. Even if industries are known to be 
more or less attractive, the expense and uncertainty involved in successfully 
redeploying resources and capabilities makes this a problem where managers need to 
learn from feedback to update their priors on suitable opportunities. Business 
managers and entrepreneurs need to iterate entire business models as decision bundles 
that contain market segments and product offerings under different degrees of 
competitive pressure until they find that sweet spot. In all these instances, individual 
managers (or a small team) make exploration-exploitation decisions that then get 
reflected at the organizational level. I expect that the aspiration levels managers adopt 
for the organization or unit performance influence this process.  
Reflecting this process, an emerging insight from the literature is that 
organizational balance depends critically on individual behavior – in particular, on 
how employees or managers make choices between exploration and exploitation and 
how those choices are conditioned by the organizational context (Eisenhardt et al., 
2010; Mom et al., 2009;  Von Hippel, 1988). Studying the micro-foundations 
underlying the organizational exploration–exploitation activities is of particular 
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relevance in the behavioral theory of the firm, where behavioral plausibility is a chief 
consideration when seeking to establish process validity and ground formal models 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012; Harrison et al., 2007;  Tracy et al., 
2017). In this essay, I examine how aspiration levels affect choices between 
exploration and exploitation at the individual level. 
The exploration–exploitation trade-off has, in its own right, been studied 
extensively at the individual level. Here scholars define the trade-off relative to the 
decision maker’s beliefs: exploitation is choosing the option that the decision maker 
currently believes to be the best alternative available; in contrast, exploration amounts 
to choosing an option that is currently not believed to be the best available (Daw 
et al., 2006). It is this definition, at the individual level of analysis, that I will use 
throughout the paper. Because individuals are uncertain about the relative 
attractiveness of the options available to them, they explore for the purpose of 
gathering more information (Cohen, McClure, and Yu, 2007). This trade-off between 
gathering and using the acquired information is especially pertinent in changing 
environments, where learning from prior experience may be less useful for making 
choices about future actions (Posen and Levinthal, 2012). 
Prior work at the individual level models the trade-off between exploration 
and exploitation in terms of reinforcement learning, which comprises two interrelated 
processes: (1) the choice process of deciding between exploiting what is currently 
believed to be the best-performing option for immediate reward versus exploring 
other options, currently believed to be inferior, for additional information; and (2) the 
adaptive learning process of translating feedback from accumulated experience into 
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representations of the task environment (Cohen, McClure, and Yu, 2007; Daw et al., 
2006; Denrell and March, 2001; Li, Mayhew, and Kourtzi, 2009; March, 1996; 
Sutton and Barto, 1998). These two processes are closely intertwined given that 
choices determine what feedback is received and that beliefs shaped by learning 
determine subsequent choices (Li, Mayhew, and Kourtzi, 2009). 
However, this work on adaptive learning has not yet considered how 
aspiration levels – a core construct in the behavioral theory of the firm – affect these 
choice and learning processes. Aspiration levels are fundamental to “satisficing” 
(Simon, 1955, 1997), and they have a strong effect on search and decision making 
(Cyert and March, 1963). However, we do not know how aspiration levels and related 
satisficing processes affect reinforcement learning and, thereby, choice. Hence I am 
motivated to study how aspiration levels influence the exploration–exploitation trade-
off in uncertain environments. 
To highlight the importance of studying these two aspects jointly, consider the 
following example. An executive at a pharmaceutical company must decide how to 
allocate resources among several alternative new technologies – such as gene therapy, 
engineering proteins, and monoclonal antibodies. This firm performs experiments by 
funding projects on each of these technologies. The executive realizes that the success 
or failure of a particular project to meet objectives (e.g., meeting internal patenting or 
rate-of-return requirements) is at best a noisy indicator of how attractive a technology 
is; as a result, the executive must learn about their relative attractiveness, 
experientially, from feedback. Although such choice problems are endemic at both 
the individual and organizational levels (one can view many resource allocation 
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problems as essentially choice problems under conditions of uncertainty and 
experiential learning), hardly any research has been devoted to exploring exactly how 
aspiration levels (or reference points) affect feedback-driven learning. 
I argue that different aspiration levels will affect learning from feedback, and 
thus the choice between exploration and exploitation, because aspiration levels affect 
how feedback is interpreted by the decision maker. I shall attend solely to exogenous 
aspiration levels, or those agreed upon or imposed from the outside, since they are the 
most relevant to the organizational context (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995; Greve, 
2002). Simon (1955) argued that aspirations perform an encoding function for the 
decision maker – in effect, categorizing the feedback space into successes and failures 
(cf. prospect theory). This encoding of continuous outcomes into categorical feedback 
can alter an individuals’ perception of the relative attractiveness of the choices, so it 
can have a notable impact on learning from feedback in ways not readily explained 
when one considers only the objective payoffs. 
To illustrate this idea, consider the following example. An individual may 
invest in two mutual funds, A and B, and obtain returns of (respectively) 9% and 11% 
after the first year. If this investor is targeting an overall 10% return as her aspiration 
level, then fund A will be classified as a failed investment and fund B as a successful 
investment. The investor will thereafter be more likely to invest in fund B, and in 
amounts that are disproportionate to the actual difference in payoffs. Suppose the 
investor continued to invest in both funds. If fund A provided returns between 8% 
and 10% and if fund B provided returns between 9% and 11%, then the investor 
would become much more confident that fund B is superior to fund A because she 
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receives unambiguous feedback from her experience: fund A provides “successes” 
(relative to her aspiration level of 10%) half the time, but it is rare for fund B to 
generate a success. In this way, even small differences between actual values – 
provided they are distributed around an aspiration level – can reduce ambiguity in the 
decision maker’s mind about which option is superior while increasing her 
confidence about its superiority. Thus I build on Posen and Levinthal’s (2012) insight 
that a decision maker’s confidence about the relative attractiveness of different 
choices (i.e., her strength of opinion) may endogenously influence her exploration 
behavior even when her strategy remains constant. Our paper takes this intuition one 
step further and suggests that strength of opinion is itself a function of the decision 
maker’s aspiration level, which in turn affects what I call feedback ambiguity. 
Feedback ambiguity captures the extent to which the possible payoffs from 
different options overlap. The more the possible payoffs (i.e., their distributions) 
overlap, the greater the feedback ambiguity experienced by decision makers when 
choosing either option. At the two extremes, feedback ambiguity will be zero if the 
possible payoffs from the different options have no overlap at all whereas feedback 
ambiguity will be complete if the possible payoffs from all choices are identical. The 
theory I develop shows that, as a decision maker learns from experience, aspiration 
levels can help (or hinder) him by reducing (or increasing) feedback ambiguity. 
Asymmetry in feedback ambiguity, which can arise among decision makers with 
different aspiration levels, affects their strength of opinion, that is the perceived 




To investigate these interrelationships, I conduct a behavioral experiment. I 
employ a simple agent-based model to develop the theory and use the model’s 
underlying multi-armed bandit task to test our hypotheses in a behavioral lab 
experiment. I find that high aspiration levels in stable environments can reduce 
feedback ambiguity, which results in greater strength of opinion and higher 
performance; both of these are driven not only by more extensive exploitation but 
also by narrower exploration. When a disruptive environmental shock alters the 
relative attractiveness of different payoffs, I find that the reduction in feedback 
ambiguity – which is beneficial in stable environments – can become a liability in 
unstable environments. Thus I document that the propensity of decision makers to 
exploit, both early and often, has a deleterious effect: it delays their adaptation to the 
exogeneous shock and so their performance recovers more slowly than does that of 
decision makers who have lower strength of opinion and who therefore engage in 
relatively more exploration. In addition, I test the mechanism’s boundary conditions 
by examining different types of payoff structures and environmental shocks. 
This study contributes to the literatures on adaptive learning and aspiration 
levels as well as (more broadly) to research on the exploration–exploitation trade-off. 
Previous work on that trade-off at the individual level has viewed the problem either 
through the lens of reinforcement learning or as a purely organization-level choice 
problem when there is a gap between performance and aspiration levels. I bring these 
two strands together by examining how individuals of varying aspiration levels learn 
about choices under uncertainty, thereby integrating two pillars of behavioral theories 
in the Carnegie tradition (Gavetti et al., 2012; see also Denrell, 2008). In this way, I 
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contribute to the micro foundations of how managers balance the need for exploration 
and exploitation in organizations. Thus I enrich the extensive literature on the 
behavioral theory of the firm, especially with regard to the organization’s response to 
an aspiration–performance gap (Gary et al., 2017; Greve, 2018; Greve and Gaba, 
2017; Posen et al., 2018; Shinkle, 2012). 
Literature Review 
In behavioral theories of the firm, the extent of exploration and exploitation depends 
not only on the environment but also on the organization’s performance relative to its 
aspiration level (Cyert and March, 1963). How performance relative to aspirations 
affects organizational decision making is the focus of an active stream of research 
that draws on several theoretical perspectives, including the behavioral theory of the 
firm and strategic reference point theory (for reviews, see Bromiley, 2010; Bromiley 
and Rau, 2019; Greve, 2003; Greve and Gaba, 2017; Posen et al., 2018; Shinkle, 
2012). 
Cyert and March (1963) argued that organizations whose performance falls 
short of aspirations will engage in problemistic search, or explore; if performance 
exceeds aspirations then they continue to execute and refine current routines and 
policies, or exploit. Subsequent research has added considerably to our understanding 
of this basic premise; thus studies have addressed the effects of different levels of the 
performance–aspiration gap in positive or negative domains (cf. Eggers and Kaul, 
2018; Greve, 2003), whether performance provides ambiguous or instead 
unambiguous feedback with respect to multiple dimensions of aspirations (Greve and 
Gaba, 2019), and the hierarchical role of the decision maker (Joseph, Klingebiel, and 
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Wilson, 2016). However, all these studies build on Cyert and March’s (1963) premise 
that lower performance relative to aspirations necessarily increases search (i.e., 
exploration). A corollary is that the higher the aspiration level, the more likely the 
firm explores – that is, because it encounters failure more frequently (Greve, 2017, 
2018).1 
In their comprehensive review of the problematic search literature, Posen 
et al. (2018) identified 53 studies that test this basic proposition. The authors were 
surprised to find that only about half of the studies found empirical support for it. The 
others found either non-significant or mixed results, and some even found the 
opposite relationship. So as the review indicates, much scholarly effort has been 
devoted to identifying moderators that can characterize the contingencies under which 
this basic hypothesis is not supported; examples include “slack” search and survival 
concerns. In a provocative study, Denrell (2008) questioned whether increased risk 
taking is actually the underlying mechanism, suggesting that the mechanism may 
instead be feedback-driven adaptation to an uncertain environment. 
As I pointed out in the Introduction, these alternative perspectives may arise 
under different circumstances. Conceptualizing exploration as search away from the 
status quo may be most apt when managers change existing routines based on 
performance feedback. Modelling the trade-off between exploration and exploitation 
as a consequence of reinforcement learning may be more applicable in a context 
 
1 In this theory, aspirations themselves change with feedback (March, 1988) – in contrast to strategic 
reference point theory, which suggests that aspirations are often externally imposed on organizations 
(Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995; Greve, 2002). Greve and Gaba (2017) and Shinkle (2012) remarked 
that few studies at the firm level actually measure aspirations or observe whether organizational 
aspirations do in fact change depending on achieved performance. 
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where managers are learning about unknown alternatives in an uncertain 
environment, where an unambiguous status quo may not exist. History plays a 
different role in these approaches: in behavioral theories, it affects aspirations 
(March, 1988); in reinforcement learning, it changes beliefs about the relative 
attractiveness of choices (Daw et al., 2006). Our aim is to shed more light on how 
these two aspects – aspiration levels and adaptive learning – interact in guiding the 
decision maker’s choice between exploration and exploitation. 
Under the micro-foundational approach, it is ultimately managers’ decisions 
that are aggregated to generate organizational choices regarding exploration and 
exploitation. Scholars have called for a renewed look at the micro foundations of 
individual and group behavior as a building block in efforts to reconcile mixed 
empirical findings and to build a more robust theory of organizations. By adopting a 
micro-foundational view of the aspiration–performance link, I aim to uncover what 
structural and/or cognitive mechanisms drive the choice between exploration and 
exploitation. 
At the micro level, the goal-setting literature presents contrasting predictions 
about how high versus moderate levels of goals (which are closely related to 
aspirations) affect individual behavior (Locke and Latham, 2009; Ordóñez et al., 
2009a, 2009b). Locke and Latham undertook a comprehensive review of the goal-
setting literature and reported that, to the extent that individuals are committed to 
goals and are able to attain them, “there is a positive linear relationship between goal 
difficulty and task performance” (2006, p. 265) because goals that are challenging 
increase effort and persistence. It is worth noting that these authors articulate the 
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relationship in terms of performance – and not with reference to whether higher 
aspirations influence exploration versus exploitation – although they do suggest that 
challenging goals motivate the search for high-performance strategies (similar to 
exploration) as well as the subsequent exploitation of those strategies (cf. Earley, 
Connolly, and Ekegren, 1989). 
In contrast, Ordóñez et al. (2009a, 2009b) argued that individuals who face 
challenging goals – rather than moderate ones – make more risky decisions (see also 
Heath, Larrick, and Wu, 1999; Larrick, Heath, and Wu, 2009). These studies suggest 
also that individuals tend to choose options with a high variance in payoffs; therefore 
increased aspiration levels do not improve overall performance. Yet most of the 
empirical evidence for these claims comes from laboratory studies, where (a) subjects 
choose once between a relatively safe bet and a risky bet and (b) the safe bet’s payoff 
is usually below the high aspiration level. The few multi-period studies that examine 
how goals affect self-regulatory processes (e.g., Cervone, Jiwani, and Wood, 1991; 
Gary et al., 2017; Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989; Wood, Bandura, and Bailey, 1990) 
fail to capture the learning–performance link. Scholars have similarly argued that, in 
reality, individuals and organizations are seldom presented either with plausible 
choices or their outcome distributions; the latter must be learned from experience 
(Denrell and Le Mens, 2011; Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; 
Le Mens and Denrell, 2011; see also Bromiley and Rau, 2019), which is subject to 
such pathologies as the “hot stove” effect (Denrell and March, 2001) and time-period 
effects (Song, Bnaya and Ma, 2019). 
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A considerable empirical literature in computer science, neuroscience, and 
psychology considers how individuals make explore–exploit decisions under 
uncertainty. However, that research does not consider how aspirations (high versus 
low) affect those decisions. This is a major gap in the literature when one considers 
that so much individual behavior is goal directed, especially in organizations, and 
involves decision making under uncertainty. 
In order to address this gap and examine more carefully how aspiration levels 
affect the choice between exploration and exploitation in uncertain environments, I 
build a simple adaptive learning model to develop hypotheses. I then test our 
hypothesized predictions in a series of behavioral laboratory studies. 
 
Adaptive Learning Model 
In order to inform our theory building, I develop a model for how adaptive learning 
affects the exploration–exploitation choice under different aspiration levels. To 
explain the basic intuition underlying the model, I first describe the following thought 
experiment. 
A Simple Thought Experiment 
Consider the two-armed bandit task illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 1. There are two 
choices to select from, “arm 1” and “arm 2”. These arms could represent investment 
options or research and development (R&D) projects. Whenever a decision maker 
selects or “pulls” an arm, she receives a payoff (e.g., return on investment). In our 
example, arm 1 returns a payoff uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 (i.e., any 
payoff received by the decision maker for choosing arm 1 will be a value between 0 
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and 1 with equal probability); arm 2 returns a payoff uniformly distributed between 
0.5 and 1.5. This example features a sizeable overlap in the two arms’ respective 
payoffs, which implies that identifying the better arm (arm 2) requires learning from 
experience over a number of trials.2 
[[ INSERT Figure 1 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Suppose there are two decision makers (DMs): one with a high aspiration 
level of 1, which is equal to the mean of the better arm’s payoff (this is DM1 in 
Figure 1); and one with a moderate aspiration level of 0.75, which is equal to the 
average payoff of both arms (DM2).3 If decision makers knew the true payoff 
distributions for both of these arms, then choosing between them would be a trivial 
task: each decision maker would always choose (i.e., exploit) arm 2, the better arm. 
There would be no need for reinforcement learning because the payoff distributions 
would be known and the decision makers’ aspiration levels would not affect their 
choices – both would choose the better arm every time. 
However, decision makers are seldom aware of the arms’ payoff distributions; 
and notwithstanding any awareness they do have, decision makers’ beliefs about each 
arm’s possible payoffs will be updated through learning from new experiences. For 
example, DM2 may first choose arm 1 (the worse one), receiving a payoff of 0.9, and 
then choose arm 2 (the better one), receiving a payoff of 0.7. If DM2’s judgment is 
 
2 Unlike the games described in many goal-setting studies, in this game the two arms have equal risk 
(i.e., their variance in payoffs is identical). In this way I isolate the exploration problem from risk 
taking (or preferences for risk). 
3 I could envision a third decision maker, DM3, with a low aspiration level equal to the average payoff 
of the worse arm; DM3 would face the mirror image of DM1’s conditions. Hence I limit our thought 




based only on these two trials, then he would judge arm 2 to be worse than arm 1. Yet 
over successive trials – assuming DM2 chooses both options repeatedly – he will 
develop a more accurate sense of the two arms’ relative payoff distribution. Thus, for 
instance, sampling both arms repeatedly may yield payoffs of less than 0.5 for arm 1 
and of more than 1 for arm 2 but not vice versa. I follow the literature prior literature 
and say that the decision maker exploits if he chooses the option that he believes 
gives the highest payoff and explores if he selects an option that he believes does not 
give the highest payoff. As he continues to select different options, the decision 
maker updates his beliefs about which option will return the better outcomes. This 
simple example underscores that learning figures prominently in a decision maker’s 
search for better options. 
How does the decision maker’s aspiration level affect this learning process? 
According to Simon (1955, p. 105, Fig. 1), aspirations perform an encoding function 
that reduces a complex environment into a smaller number of states. He argues that 
this encoding function is an essential purpose of aspirations, partitioning the payoff 
space into successes and failures (see also Heath et al., 1999). If that process is 
applied to our thought experiment in Figure 1b, then DM1 – with a high aspiration 
level of 1 – will encode all received payoffs above 1 as “successes” and all received 
payoffs below 1 as “failures”. Yet DM2, with a moderate aspiration level of 0.75, will 
encode all received payoffs above 0.75 as “successes” and below 0.75 as “failures.” 
This simple difference in decision makers’ interpretation of the received payoffs 
fundamentally alters their learning and choice processes. 
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Decision makers with different aspiration levels likewise encounter different 
degrees of feedback ambiguity. Recall that feedback ambiguity captures the extent to 
which the possible payoffs from different options overlap. In our thought experiment, 
the feedback ambiguity experienced by DM1 is much lower than the ambiguity that 
DM2 experiences. More specifically, DM1 will encode almost all payoffs received 
from arm 1 as “failures” because the worse arm’s highest possible payoff is 1 – the 
same as her aspiration level. Given the small overlap between arm 1’s payoff 
distribution and her aspiration level, the feedback ambiguity is quite low (yet it is 
nonzero because she has a 50% chance of receiving payoffs of less than 1 from 
arm 2). Thus DM1, who has a high aspiration level, will probably categorize most 
feedback from the low-payoff option as “failures.” Hence this reduction in feedback 
ambiguity increases the high-payoff option’s relative attractiveness and, thereby, the 
decision maker’s confidence about the two arms’ relative attractiveness, or her 
strength of opinion (Posen and Levinthal, 2012). In contrast, DM2 (whose aspiration 
level is a moderate 0.75) has a 75% chance of encoding any given payoff from arm 2 
as a “success” (vs. a 50% chance by DM1). Yet DM2 interprets a greater proportion 
of arm 1’s payoffs as successful as well, with a 25% probability of encoding the 
payoffs received from the worse arm as “successes”. The result is a higher level of 
feedback ambiguity for DM2 because the greater overlap in “success” payoffs across 
the two options reduces her strength of opinion about the relative attractiveness of the 
two arms. 
When aspiration levels are high (DM1 in Figure 1), the worse arm 
consistently returns payoff feedback that is categorized as a failure. Even with a 
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limited number of trials, these repeated failures unambiguously signal to the decision 
maker that this arm should be avoided. Thus, his high aspiration level – and his 
resulting categorization of feedback into successes and failures – has the effect of 
reducing feedback ambiguity. I therefore posit that aspiration levels may either 
increase or decrease the feedback ambiguity experienced by a decision maker, thus 
reducing or amplifying (respectively) his strength of opinion. In this sense, feedback 
ambiguity is a structural mechanism that affects a cognitive factor: the decision 
maker’s strength of opinion. 
In contrast to the case of high aspiration levels, a decision maker with only 
moderate aspirations (here, DM2) experiences successes and failures from both arms. 
When the number of trials is more limited, these mixed successes and failures send a 
more ambiguous signal about both arms; hence the decision maker will be less certain 
(than if she had high aspirations) about which arm is worse, and which arm is better, 
and so faces relatively greater feedback ambiguity. In our thought experiment, then, 
an agent with high aspirations is more confident about identifying the inferior arm 
(and therefore the superior arm) – has greater “strength of opinion” – than an agent 
with moderate aspirations.4 
Posen and Levinthal (2012) theorized that a reduction in strength of opinion 
endogenously increases exploration behavior even if the decision strategy is constant. 
I augment their account by suggesting that strength of opinion may itself be a 
function of the decision maker’s aspiration level that affects the feedback ambiguity 
that he experiences. Thus I suggest that feedback ambiguity is the mechanism via 
 
4 I provide a more detailed explanation of this process in the Online Supplement.  
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which aspiration levels influence adaptive learning and, ultimately, the choice 
between exploration and exploitation. These considerations lead to the following 
proposition. 
Aspiration levels can generate different degrees of feedback 
ambiguity, which in turn affect the decision makers’ choice of 
exploration versus exploitation. To the extent that higher aspiration 
levels are more likely to reduce feedback ambiguity about the 
inferiority of the inferior options, , they are also more likely to 
encourage more exploitation (resp., less exploration) of superior 
(resp., inferior) options. 
For the sake of simplicity, our thought experiment uses a two-armed bandit 
task in a stable environment. However, choices regarding exploration and exploitation 
often arise in more complex decision tasks that may involve changing environments 
and multiple options (arms). 
First, environmental changes reduce the usefulness of prior learning through 
experience and require that decision makers re-sample the arms to learn how their 
payoffs are distributed after any change. For instance, the previously worse arm may 
now provide better payoffs on average. Precisely because the feedback ambiguity 
mechanism and strength of opinion both rely on differences in the beliefs formed 
through adaptive learning, I can demonstrate this mechanism more convincingly in an 
environment where such opinion strength can be a liability – as in, for example, an 
unstable environment (Posen and Levinthal, 2012). 
24 
 
Second, a task involving multiple choices, constitutes a more complex 
decision-making environment. In order to test whether the feedback ambiguity 
generated (or reduced) by aspiration levels affects the decision-maker’s strength of 
opinion, the payoff environment needs to be sufficiently complex. In particular, 
aspiration levels can change feedback ambiguity differentially across available 
choices. A three-armed bandit task is therefore the minimal set-up in which I can 
explore the mechanism of feedback ambiguity as well as how it affects the level of 
exploitation under changing environments. 
However, a pure thought experiment with three options in a changing 
environment quickly becomes intractable. I therefore develop our hypotheses with the 
aid of a simple agent-based simulation designed to explore the effect of aspirational 
levels and feedback ambiguity on the level of exploitation and performance. Then I 
use the same task set-up to test those hypotheses in a behavioral laboratory 
experiment. 
Agent-Based Simulation 
In order to understand how adaptive learning and aspiration levels jointly affect the 
exploration–exploitation trade-off with environmental shocks, I set up a three-armed 
bandit task whose arms are differentially attractive yet equally risky (i.e., their 
payoffs have different means but the same standard deviation) and for which the 
payoff distribution is unknown to the agents. More specifically, I create a three-armed 
bandit task for which the arms’ payoffs are uniformly distributed with means of [25, 
20, 15] for arms 1, 2, 3 (respectively), each with constant interval of  ±10. This setup 
is identical to the investment game in our laboratory experiment. The agents can 
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obtain information about the arms only by sampling and adaptive learning. Thus 
agents learn by updating their beliefs about the different options’ payoffs as they 
sample them across the rounds 𝑡 of the simulation.  
In line with our thought experiment, I set the high aspiration level equal to the 
best arm’s mean payoff (25) and the moderate aspiration level equal to the average 
payoff (20) of all three arms. Then the middle arm’s payoff is distributed around the 
moderate aspiration whereas the best arm’s payoff is distributed around the high 
aspiration (as described in the thought experiment). This set-up of the arms and 
aspiration levels results in asymmetric feedback ambiguity: the worst arm provides 
feedback that is unambiguously bad for an agent with high aspirations yet is 
ambiguous for agents of moderate aspiration levels. Thus our set-up replicates the 
differential feedback ambiguity across arms discussed previously. At the same time, 
our set-up captures the common conceptualizations of high and moderate aspirations: 
high (also labelled “challenging” or “stretch”) aspiration is difficult to reach, yet still 
feasible, corresponding to the industry leader’s performance;  moderate aspiration is 
relatively easy to reach, reflecting industry average performance (Gary et al., 2017; 
Locke and Latham, 1990).  
If I set the high aspiration level even higher, agents with high aspiration levels 
would converge on the best arm even faster; if I set the moderate aspiration to the 
average of the lowest arm, then feedback ambiguity (between the low and middle 
arm) would be reduced for those low–aspiration level agents by an amount equivalent 
to the reduction in feedback ambiguity for the high–aspiration level agents. Setting 
the aspiration at high and moderate levels allows us to maximize the difference in 
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feedback ambiguity between the two aspiration level conditions studied without 
adding needless complexity to the model.5 
Adaptive learning models of a bandit tasks are commonly modelled with both a 
belief updating rule and a choice rule (Sutton and Barto, 1998, Puranam et al, 2015, 
Posen and Levinthal, 2012). In addition to these standard components, I incorporate a 
feedback interpreting process as commonly implemented by the reference point 
literature (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Larrick & Wu, 1999) to model the effect of 
aspiration levels.6 Here, I describe each of these in turn. 
 Feedback interpreting process: To incorporate the effect of aspiration levels 
in the adaptive learning model, I build on the reference point literature (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992; al-Nowaihi, Bradley & Dhami, 2007; Heath, Larrick & Wu, 1999) 
and interpret aspirations as reference points to interpret feedback. I therefore model 




, 𝑖𝑓 𝐴 ≤ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
−(𝐴 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝛼
, 𝑖𝑓 𝐴 > 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
 
In this formulation, 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 represents the utility that an agent attaches to the payoff 
received from arm 𝑖 in round 𝑡, i.e. the utility based on interpreted feedback. 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
denotes the received payoff (or reward) from arm 𝑖 in round 𝑡, and 𝐴 captures the 
aspiration level (or reference point). Therefore, the agent’s feedback interpretation in 
 
5 If the high aspiration is set so high that all arms result in failure, or if the moderate aspiration level is 
set so low that all arms return successes, then the feedback ambiguity mechanism is no longer in play. 
6 Our results are robust to a wide range of 𝜏-values (or temperatures): from 0.002 to about 1. This range 




round 𝑡 is positive if the aspiration level 𝐴 is greater or equal than the received payoff 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and negative if the the aspiration level is below the received payoff. This 
feedback interpretation is affected by 𝛼 ∈ [0,1], the diminishing sensitivity 
parameter.7 𝛼 = 0 is a special case when feedback was strictly dichotomized into 
“successes” or “failures”  
Belief updating rule: I follow the standard textbook (Sutton and Barto, 2018, p. 
32) and use an incremental value updating rule (i.e., temporal difference rule) to 
update the agent’s belief (also see Denrell 2007; Stieglitz, Knudsen and Becker, 
2016). 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃(𝑈𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑞𝑖,𝑡) 
 
here 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is the estimated representation of the agent’s belief about arm 𝑖 arm at time 𝑡 
(and 𝑞𝑖,𝑡+1 denotes the updated representation at time (𝑡 + 1)). The 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 term inserts 
the feedback interpreting process into the belief updating rule and 𝜃 ∈ (0,1) is the 
stepwise parameter governing the speed of learning –  the greater 𝜃 is, the stronger 
the recent feedback is weighted in the representation.  
Choice rule: I continue to follow the classic setup (Sutton and Barto, 1998) for 
the learning rule. Here, the probability of a given agent choosing a particular arm 𝑖 is 
based on his beliefs 𝑞𝑖,𝑡, following a Softmax rule: 
 
7 For simplicity, I assume preference-homogeneity: the diminishing sensitivity parameter is identical 













in which 𝜋𝑖 is the probability of choosing the ith arm among the total number of 
available arms 𝑀, and 𝜏 ≥ 0 is the parameter that governs exploration strategy. The 
higher the 𝜏 is, the lower the agent’s sensitivity to the current beliefs and the greater 
his likelihood to choose the arm with inferior beliefs. As 𝜏 approaches zero, the agent 
only chooses the arm with the highest belief, i.e. only exploits. 
The simulation runs for 50 periods. For each aspiration level, I simulate 
500,000 agents, with parametrization 𝛼 = 0.5, 𝜃 = 0.2 and 𝜏 = 0.2. I “seed” the 
simulation by assuming that agents will pull each arm once before the simulation 
starts, giving them a value for the first term in the belief updating rule in period 18. 
This approach ensures that the simulation results are not biased by our assignment of 
an arbitrary value for 𝑞𝑖,0. Thereafter, agents choose an option in every round based 
on the choice rule described. As agents with high versus moderate aspiration levels 
learn, the simulation reveals several interesting interactions among learning, 
aspiration levels, and environmental shock and also shows how these interactions 
affect exploration–exploitation behavior. These outcomes form the basis of our 
hypotheses. 
In line with our proposition advanced in the previous section, the model 
shows agents with high aspiration levels are less (more) likely to explore (exploit), 
that is, not pulling the arm with the highest belief 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 (shown in Figure 2a). The 
 
8 Robustness of the parameterization can be found in the Appendix, where I systematically vary these 
parameters. I also vary the seeding of initial belief. 
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model also shows that agents with high aspiration levels settle on the best arm more 
quickly than do moderate–aspiration level agents. Figure 2b plots the likelihood of 
choosing each arm as agents learn over time. The results highlight that feedback 
ambiguity remains even for high–aspiration level agents: they do explore (i.e., choose 
the option they believe not to be the best arm) and they neither immediately nor 
entirely settle on the best option. Yet when compared with agents who have a 
moderate aspiration level, high–aspiration level agents experience less feedback 
ambiguity and are therefore more likely to choose the arm they believe is the best 
(i.e., to exploit), and are also more likely to be correct (i.e., actually choose the truly 
best arm). 
[[ INSERT Figure 2 ABOUT HERE ]] 
To highlight the mechanism by which feedback ambiguity affects learning and 
choices, I examine the impact of feedback ambiguity on agents’ formation of beliefs 
and hence on their strength of opinion. Figure 3 illustrates the standard deviation of 
the difference in the beliefs of agents with high versus moderate levels of aspiration; 
that is, the feedback from payoffs as interpreted through the lens of their respective 
aspiration levels. The three panels in Figure 3 illustrate this difference for every 
combination of arms (within-panel comparisons). In this figure, the lower the 
standard deviation of differences in belief, the higher the ambiguity about which arm 
is better. 
[[ INSERT Figure 3 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Overall, a high aspiration level leads to a lower standard deviation of the 
beliefs about arms’ payoffs and hence to less ambiguity about which arm is better. 
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Thus agents with high aspirations pick the best arm across each pair with greater 
certainty and, as a result, are less likely to explore other arms. In particular, Figures 
3(a) and 3(b) establish that high-aspiration agents are more certain (than their 
moderate-aspiration counterparts) that the best arm is superior to both the middle arm 
and the worse arm. This dynamic explains why, in Figure 2, high–aspiration level 
agents are more likely to exploit the best arm; it also emphasizes that agents with a 
high aspiration level sample the worst arm less often, which further increases their 
certainty about the best arm’s payoffs. Thus I are led to our first hypothesis, 
as follow. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). High–aspiration level agents choose the option that they 
believe is best (exploit) more frequently than do agents of moderate aspiration 
level. 
In a stable task environment, where the payoff distributions are not changing, 
exploitation of the best arm leads to better performance regardless of aspiration level. 
High aspiration levels facilitate finding the best arm – as well as a strategic focus on 
exploitation – by reducing ambiguity in the feedback from alternatives, which leads 
to finding the best-performing arm sooner and also to higher cumulative performance 
(as shown in Figure 2b). Thus H1 implies that high–aspiration level agents explore 
less often than do agents with moderate aspiration levels. High–aspiration level 
agents exploit more and explore less; hence they will probably perform better at tasks, 
such as this one, for which the arms’ payoffs (means and distributions) remain 
constant. Formally, I have the following hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis 2a (H2a). High–aspiration level agents choose the truly best 
option more frequently  in a stable environment than do agents with moderate 
aspiration levels. 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). High–aspiration level agents exhibit better cumulative 
performance in a stable environment than do agents of moderate aspiration 
level. 
When the task environment is changing, however, a strategy that focuses on 
exploitation hinders adaptation to new payoff structures. If agents use adaptive 
learning to form their beliefs about the relative attractiveness of choices, then those 
with stronger beliefs are more likely to persist with them – and for a longer period – 
under some kinds of environmental turbulence (Posen and Levinthal, 2012). Suppose, 
for instance, that the payoffs of previously unattractive choices improve while those 
of previously attractive choices decline. Because agents with stronger beliefs are less 
likely to explore unattractive choices, they are also less likely to observe this 
particular change as it occurs. Since a higher aspiration level can lead to stronger 
belief formation, it follows that agents with higher aspiration levels adapt less quickly 
to the new environment following a disruptive shock. 
I undertake another simulation to assess this intuition. Expanding the previous 
set-up, I introduce a disruptive shock – after period 30 – that changes the mean payoff 
of arms 1, 2, and 3 from [25, 20, 15] to [20, 15, 25]. That is, the worst arm becomes 
the best arm and the other arms shift downward in value.9 
 
9 I shift these payoffs – that is, rather than merely increasing the worst arm’s payoff above the other 
two arms – so as to maintain the relevance of high (and moderate) aspiration levels. If the worst arm’s 
payoff increases beyond the payoffs of the other arms, then “high” aspiration loses its meaning. 
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[[ INSERT Figure 4 ABOUT HERE ]] 
I find that, although the strong beliefs developed by a high-aspiration agent 
serve her well in a stable environment, those beliefs prevent her from adapting to a 
changed payoff structure in a timely fashion. Figure 4 plots the difference between 
high and low aspiration levels in the choice between arms 1 and 3 following the 
shock. This figure reveals that, before the shock, agents with high aspirations exploit 
the best arm and avoid exploring the worst arm. However, this strong preference for 
the best arm before a shock delays the agent’s identification of the best arm after a 
shock. There are clear performance implications of high–aspiration level agents’ 
slower adaptation to the changed payoff, and our simulation motivates the following 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a). High–aspiration level agents choose the newly changed 
best option less frequently after a disruptive environmental shock than do 
agents with moderate aspirations. 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b). High–aspiration level agents exhibit worse 
performance directly after a disruptive environmental shock than do agents of 
moderate aspiration level. 
In sum, I have used this agent-based simulation of a multi-armed bandit task 
in a changing environment to refine the insights derived from our previous thought 
experiment. Perhaps more importantly, the model itself makes explicit our 
assumptions about how aspiration levels affect learning from feedback. Doing so 





To test the hypotheses, I design a behavioral lab experiment in which I manipulate the 
aspiration level and then observe participants’ exploration and exploitation choices as 
well as their performance. The hypotheses are tested in the three main studies, and 
boundary conditions are explored in an additional five studies. Each experimental 
participant plays a single-player investment game that uses the same multi-armed 
bandit task as the adaptive learning model already described. This task has been used 
extensively to study exploration–exploitation behavior in studies both theoretical 
(Denrell and March, 2001; Lee and Puranam, 2016; Posen and Levinthal, 2012; 
Sutton and Barto, 1998; for a review, see Puranam et al., 2015) and experimental 
(Cohen et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2006; Gans, Knox, and Croson, 2007; Knox et al., 
2012). As Simon (1947) stressed, exploration–exploration decisions are inherently 
behavioral because prior probabilities are unknown and must be learned in a trial-and-
error process. And because choice and learning processes are intertwined in these 
problems (March, 1991; Sutton and Barto, 1998), experimental studies can be used to 
make valuable inferences by controlling the information available (Edmonds, 2001; 
Schunk, 2009; Sterman, 1989). 
As described in the discussion of our thought experiment, a multi-armed 
bandit task gives the decision-maker a choice between multiple options, or “arms”. 
Each option has an uncertain payoff, which implies that: (1) the decision maker does 
not know ex ante which of the different options is better or worse; and (2) the 
feedback received from choosing an option is noisy. In our set-up, all three options 
are uniformly distributed and have the same variance but different means. Panel (a) in 
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Figure 5 illustrates the three arms’ respective payoff distributions for all studies. All 
studies start with the same three arms: the payoffs are uniformly distributed with 
means [25, 20, 15] for arms 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and with a constant interval of 
±10. These payoffs were chosen so that there is not only sufficient overlap for 
feedback ambiguity to exist but also sufficient unique feedback for decision makers to 
discern payoff differences over time. 
[[ INSERT Figure 5 ABOUT HERE ]] 
In order to enable learning from experience, decision makers play the 
investment game over 50 (or 80) rounds. In each round, the decision maker chooses 
whatever option he wants and receives a payoff. Over time, the decision maker learns 
which, of the options he explores, yields higher or lower payoffs (on average). The 
decision maker’s payoffs accumulate over the rounds of the game, and his goal is to 
maximize the end-of-game payoff. In each of the studies, participants are randomly 
allocated to a high- or moderate-aspiration condition. In our baseline (Study 1) the 
environment remains constant, whereas participants experience an environmental 
shock in Studies 2 and 3; this shock changes the means of the different investment 
options yet leaves the overall payoff landscape otherwise unchanged (as shown in 
Figure 5). I also perform robustness checks with an added control condition (viz., no 
manipulation of the aspiration level) and explore the boundary conditions of our 
findings with different incentive structures and alternative shock characteristics 




The lab experiment was set up as a between-subject design across three main studies. 
In each study, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a high 
or moderate level of aspiration; I also re-ran all three studies with an added control 
(“no–aspiration level” condition). I ensured that each participant participated in only 
one of the studies.10 
The three main studies exposed participants to different task environments. In 
two of them, the arms were subject to a shock (after round 30) that re-ordered the 
arms’ relative attractiveness. It is the adjustments that participants make to these 
shocks that help us understand their exploration behavior. In particular: the more a 
participant explores, the more likely she is to shift choices in response to an abrupt 
shock. Study 1 reflects the baseline (no-shock) environment, while Studies 2 and 3 
incorporate an identical disruptive shock (but with different post-shock periods: Study 
2 has 20 post-shock periods to keep the total number of periods at 50; Study 3 has 50 
post-shock periods for a total of 80 rounds). When studying the boundary conditions 
of our findings, I explore the effects of a positive shock in Study 4. Figure 5(a) 
summarizes the different study conditions used across all studies. The task set-up 
ensured that time pressure was not a factor: I did not limit participants’ available 
time, and the time needed to play the game averaged just under 1.5 minutes 
(excluding the introduction and briefing of the game; 2 minutes for games with 
extended periods). 
 
10 The verbatim instructions and procedures for this lab experiment can be found in the Online 
Supplement. I include screenshots for the investment game and the balloon analogue risk task. 
Additional information on the underlying model can be found here: . 
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Task Description. In line with our theoretical intent, I framed the task as one 
of investment choice under uncertainty. Each participant adopts the role of an R&D 
manager for a digital business firm and, in each round, decides on a product platform 
in which to invest. Participants are informed that the payoffs are uncertain and subject 
to market turbulence. The task description also points out that random environmental 
shocks could alter the relative attractiveness of the arms. These instructions are given 
regardless of whether the Study contained a shock. The Online Supplement includes 
screenshots of the experimental set-up and highlights the (few) instructional lines that 
differ across conditions and studies. 
In each period, participants select one of the three available choices (arms) for 
investment. Upon making an investment, a participant immediately receives a payoff 
that is displayed as points earned on the given arm. The feedback is clearly tied to the 
choice just made (see Online Supplement), and it also updates the cumulative payoffs 
(at the top of the screen) as well as the current round and progress. Participants can 
see – at any time – their cumulative payoff, the total number of trials played, the 
number of times each choice was sampled, and the average payoff received from each 
choice. 
Treatment Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to the high or 
moderate aspiration level condition. In all studies, participants were informed that 
they should attempt to achieve a particular performance goal. I implemented the 
manipulation for high [resp. moderate] aspiration levels by instructing the participants 
as follows: “The previous manager had achieved total earnings of 1,250 [1,000] 
37 
 
points over their tenure of 50 rounds, that is, 25 [20] points per round. You should 
aim to earn at least this amount.”11 
I set the high aspiration level equivalent to the value of the best arm’s mean 
payoff, so it serves as the benchmark of the best possible alternative in this game. I 
selected this value (in the upper 10th percentile) in line with goal-setting theory on 
establishing goals that are challenging yet achievable (Locke and Latham, 2006). The 
moderate aspiration level is equivalent to the mean payoff of all three arms and is 
relatively easy to achieve, since pulling the arms at random would ensure a 50% 
chance of receiving a payoff higher than the moderate aspiration level. 
Feedback ambiguity captures the extent of possible payoff overlap across 
different options. The degree to which the decision maker experiences feedback 
ambiguity, in turn, depends on the decision maker’s aspiration level. Panels (b) 
and (c) of Figure 5 plot the feedback ambiguity experienced by participants with 
(respectively) high and moderate aspiration levels. These panels illustrate how 
feedback ambiguity experienced differs in our setup, due to payoff distributions 
across choices and aspiration levels. I anticipate that the feedback ambiguity 
experienced by decision makers accounts for the strength of their opinions about the 
relative attractiveness of different options, which in turn affects their exploration–
exploitation behavior (and hence performance).  
Participant Recruitment. For Studies 1 and 3 (as well as the boundary 
condition studies 5a, 5b, 6a, and 6b), participants were recruited through Amazon’s 
 
11 I also ran all three studies again while using an added control condition without a specified 
aspiration level but with a “do your best” instruction. 
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Mechanical Turk (MTurk). For Study 2, I recruited participants from a public 
university in the United States and the experiment was conducted in a lab setting. In 
Study 4, students from an undergraduate course at a Singapore university participated 
in the experiment as part of a class exercise. Because adaptive learning and search 
behavior are fundamental human behaviors, I decided to run our laboratory studies in 
different countries so as to increase (howsoever slightly) the external validity of our 
findings.12 Table 1 summarizes our data collection as well as participants’ 
demographics.13 I used our first study to inform our power analysis and estimated that 
a sample size of 72 (resp. 98) would give us statistical power of 0.8 (resp. 0.9). The 
power analysis is reported in the Online Supplement. 
[[ INSERT Table 1 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Across the different studies, MTurk participants were similar in terms of the 
basic demographic dimensions that I were able to collect. On average, about 32% 
identified as female, and reported an age of 35 on average (with a wide range between 
19 and 70 years old). The majority of MTurk participants reported English as their 
first language and around 66% reported at least a 2-year college degree. I found a 
difference in country of residence for studies run before versus during the pandemic 
(resp. 90% versus 71% from North America). In contrast to the MTurk studies, the 
two university samples were younger (21 on average), had a higher percentage of 
 
12 The university-based studies were conducted without this control condition and were therefore 
replicated on MTurk for the high-, moderate-, and no-aspiration condition. The results across the 
university and MTurk studies are consistent, and our findings from the latter are reported in the Results 
section (under robustness checks). Under normal circumstances I would have re-run these studies with 
exactly the same populations of participants. However, the Covid-19 pandemic has precluded re-




female participants (46%), and fewer students with English as their first language (in 
the US sample, not available for Singapore). Overall, this set of study populations 
provides us with some degree of generalizability. The fact that search tendencies 
among these diverse participants were consistent, in very different exogeneous 
conditions of uncertainty (before and during the height of the pandemic) appears to 
indicate that our studies indeed capture a fundamental human behaviour.  
Incentive Structures. The incentives designed for this study clearly matter 
because they make choices consequential (Smith, 1976). In Studies 2 and 4, subjects 
were rewarded with course participation credits. I incentivized the participants to 
perform well by offering a $10 gift certificate to each of the top five performers. For 
Studies 1 and 3, I replaced course credit with a fixed payment for participation but 
otherwise maintained the same performance-based incentives. In setting up this first 
incentive structure, I followed the goal-setting literature in using “mere goals” – in 
other words, goals that simply establish a reference point (Heath et al., 1999; Larrick 
et al., 2009) – and then observing whether such a simple manipulation results in 
behavioral differences. 
However, research has also shown that winner-takes-all incentives (the type 
described above) may boost risk taking and hence exploration (Ederer and Manso, 
2013; Manso, 2011). If the incentive design applied to the first three studies does 
indeed encourage more risk taking and exploration, then the set-up will provide a 
conservative test of hypotheses that instead predict more exploitation. Yet because 
incentive design has a pronounced effect on learning and aspiration levels, I ran 
additional studies to examine the effect of different incentive structures on the 
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relationship under study. In particular, I ran the Studies 1 and 3 (since Study 2 is just 
a shorter version of the latter) with two alternative incentive structures. One structure 
ties performance directly to the aspiration levels by specifying a fixed bonus for 
achieving a clear goal expressed in accumulated payoff points. The other structure is 
a “pay for performance” set-up based on a stipulated exchange rate between payoffs 
earned and US dollar (USD) values. I integrated the latter into our manipulation of 
the aspiration level by way of the examples included in the design description. I 
expand on these incentive structures when discussing the results for these boundary 
condition studies. 
Measures and Analyses 
Our study’s objective is to explain how exploration–exploitation behavior changes 
with different aspiration levels. I manipulate and measure aspiration levels by setting 
them and their payoff distributions, as described previously. 
To test Hypotheses 1, I must capture exploitation frequency. An effective test 
of this hypothesis requires that exploration and exploitation behavior reflect the 
decision maker’s perspective. I therefore estimate decision makers’ beliefs as in Daw 
et al. (2006). Thus I estimate the decision makers’ beliefs about which option is the 
best or worst in any given round by fitting participants’ choices and payoffs into a 
temporal difference learning algorithm and a softmax choice algorithm (see Daw 
et al. 2006). The best-fitted model then yields estimates of the subjects’ beliefs about 
each arm in each period, which enables our encoding of the decision maker’s 
exploration and exploitation behavior over the 50 (or 80) rounds of the study. As 
described above, I define Exploitation as choosing the option that the focal decision 
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maker believes to be the best; exploration then amounts to choosing an options that he 
believes is not the best (exploration measured this way is the exact inverse of 
Exploitation). 
Performance is measured in two ways. To test Hypotheses 2a and 3a, I 
measure how frequently a decision maker chooses the truly best option among the 
three choices (known to us but not known with certainty to the experiment’s decision 
makers). In the stable environment (H2a), this option does not change over the course 
of the study; in the environmental shock condition (H3a), I measure how frequently 
decision makers choose the truly best new option after the shock in round 30. To 
assess Hypotheses 2b and 3b, I take the accumulated number of points earned by a 
decision maker over the 50 (or 80) rounds in order to compare relative performance 
(across aspiration levels). 
Analyses. I analyze the data using t-tests and analysis of variation (ANOVA) 
for basic comparisons in addition to generalized linear mixed models for our 
hierarchical round–subject analyses (rounds are nested within participants); the 
Online Supplement presents basic logit and ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions 
as robustness checks. In the round-level analyses, I follow suggestions in prior work 
(e.g., Billinger et al., 2013; Levine et al., 2019) and control for feedback variables, 
namely round number, prior round performance, prior average achieved so far, and 
time taken to make a choice. I also control for participant demographics such as age, 
gender, college major, and risk-taking propensity; the latter is measured by way of the 





In discussing the results, I briefly summarize each of the study conditions and then 
document our findings. I hypothesized about the relative differences in exploration 
and exploitation choices by decision makers who face high versus moderate 
aspiration levels. Hence this section focuses on that comparison. 
Study 1: Stable Environment 
In Study 1, participants play the three-armed bandit game in a stable environment; the 
payoffs are uniformly distributed, with means [25, 20, 15] for arms 1, 2, and 3 
(respectively) and a constant interval of ±10. The high (resp. moderate) aspiration 
level is set at 25 (resp. 20) points per round, accumulating to 1,250 (resp. 1,000) 
points over 50 rounds. Based on the decision maker’s assignment of payoffs into the 
categories of “success” or “failure” relative to his aspiration level, the success 
percentages for the three arms are about [55%, 30%, 5%] for the high-aspiration 
condition and [80%, 55%, 30%] for the moderate-aspiration condition (this is 
illustrated in Figure 5). 
Exploration–Exploitation Choices. I predicted that the high-aspiration 
decision makers will exploit more (H1) and hence explore less. I use ANOVA to test 
this hypothesis. I find that participants in the high-aspiration condition exploit the 
option they believe to be best significantly more often (mean M = 29.2, standard 
deviation SD = 4.9) than do those with a moderate aspiration level (M = 27.4, SD = 
4.0; F-statistic = 8.17, p-value < 0.01) – outcomes that support Hypothesis 1. Support 
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for this hypothesis also implies that high-aspiration participants explore less than their 
moderate aspiration counterparts. The results are summarized in Table 2.  
[[ INSERT Table 2 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Performance. I predicted that decision makers with high aspiration levels 
would be more likely than those with moderate aspiration to choose the truly best 
option (H2a) and would also exhibit better cumulative performance. I find that 
participants in the high-aspiration condition do choose arm 1, the objectively best 
arm, significantly more often (M = 29.1, SD = 5.4) than those with moderate levels of 
aspiration (M = 26.4, SD = 4.4; F = 15.18, p < 0.01) – providing support for 
Hypothesis 2a (see Table 2). In addition, cumulative performance is significantly 
higher in the high-aspiration condition (M = 1111.0, SD = 53.6) than in the moderate-
aspiration one (M = 1080.6, SD = 57.8; F = 14.37, p < 0.01); these results support 
Hypothesis 2b. 
Our theory suggests that the mechanism driving these outcomes is the greater 
strength of opinion that high–aspiration level participants develop in response to 
reduced feedback ambiguity. For this mechanism to be plausible, I first have to 
examine whether there is any indication that high-aspiration participants experience a 
reduction in feedback ambiguity. Recall that I manipulate feedback ambiguity by 
setting the two aspiration levels such that high-level participants should encode more 
feedback from the worst arm as failures than moderate-level ones. To illustrate that 
high-aspiration participants do indeed experience the feedback received differently, I 
use the success rate per arm as a proxy. I compute success rate for each arm by 
encoding the payoffs experienced above (resp. below) aspiration level as successes 
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(resp. failures). I then take the simple average across those experiences for each arm. 
For example, suppose that, prior to the focal period, a participant who chose a given 
arm had two experiences above aspiration and three experiences below aspiration; 
thus she experienced a success rate of 0.4 for that arm. Figure 6 presents the 
histogram of each arm’s success rate as experienced by participants in the prior 
period (ordered by frequency of different success rates experienced, not by rounds). 
For high–aspiration level participants, these histograms show that the worst arm 
provides unambiguous feedback of “failure” (Panel (c) of the figure) whereas the best 
and middle arm provide feedback that is more ambiguous (see Panels (a) and (b)). For 
moderate–aspiration level participants, in contrast, all three arms provide ambiguous 
feedback.14 
[[ INSERT Figure 6 ABOUT HERE ]] 
I exploit the longitudinal nature of our experiment to examine in more detail 
the mechanism of whether these differences in feedback ambiguity affect 
participants’ strength of opinion which then drive the difference in exploitation 
behavior I find. For this purpose, I create a data set at the subject–round level so that I 
can analyze how prior feedback affects decisions in every round. I proxy strength of 
opinion by estimating participants’ belief difference between the best and the worst 
arm. If high-aspiration level participants do indeed experience lower feedback 
ambiguity (as illustrated in Figure 5), their estimated belief difference between best 
and worst arm should be higher than that of moderate-aspiration level participants. 
 




The reason for that is that almost every time they pull the worst arm (arm 3), they 
receive unambiguously negative feedback; as a result, their belief that the best (arm 1) 
gives different payoffs from the worst one and that arm 1 is superior will be quite 
strong. But moderate-aspiration participants receive relatively more positive feedback 
from arm 3 (the worst arm) and relatively less positive feedback from arm 1 (relative 
to high-aspiration participants), which makes their belief about the difference in 
payoffs between those two arms relatively weaker. Given the hierarchical nature of 
our data (i.e., rounds are nested within participants), I use a generalized linear mixed 
model to predict participants’ exploitation of the best arm in each round.15 In Stata, I 
use a Bernoulli distribution for the dependent variable “exploit” and a logit link 
function. I use the fixed effects model for the variables of interest and random effects 
per participant (since the subjects in this case were randomly sampled and allocated 
to conditions). 
In Table 3, Model [1] replicates the ANOVA effects across periods. As 
expected, I observe that subjects have a higher likelihood to choose the arm they 
believe is best (i.e., exploit) in later rounds – an indication of learning – and when 
they have achieved high outcomes in previous rounds. I see also that participants’ 
overall probability to exploit is lower when their propensity for risk taking (as 
measured by the BART score) is higher.16 The values reported in Model [2] confirm 
 
15 The correlation matrix and robustness checks using OLS and logit models are given in the Online 
Supplement. 
16 I tested the effect of BART on the probability to exploit in all the studies. Even though the BART 
score was almost identical across the variety of populations I sampled, I only found a significant 
negative effect of the BART score on exploitation in the no-shock study and in Study 6b. 
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that high-aspiration participants exploit the best arm more often than do their 
moderate-aspiration counterparts. 
[[ INSERT Table 3 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Finally, Models [3]–[5] in the table shed more light on the mechanism involved. Thus 
Model [3] shows that the focal participant’s experience with different arms increases 
the likelihood of exploiting what he believes to be the best arm.17 Specifically, it is 
the greater the difference in payoffs experienced from prior feedback about the best 
and worst arms’ relative attractiveness that increases the participant’s likelihood to 
exploit. Model [4] is included to show the robustness of the model, while Model [5] 
reveals a positive interaction effect between high aspiration level and the belief 
difference between the best and the worst arm. Incorporating that interaction effect 
into the regression renders non-significant the main effect of a high aspiration level. 
This finding provides further support for our hypothesized mechanism: by reducing 
feedback ambiguity, high aspiration levels evidently influence how feedback is 
interpreted, which results in greater strength of opinion which increases the likelihood 
of exploitation. 
[[ INSERT Figure 7 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Overall, Study 1’s baseline results indicate that high aspiration levels 
influence adaptive learning via a reduction in feedback ambiguity. This dynamic is 
illustrated in Figure 7. The graph shows that, when participants develop greater 
strength of opinion – i.e. greater belief difference between the best and worst arm – 
 
17 All participants exhibited some exploration behavior – enough so that all participants selected and 
received feedback about different arms. 
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participants can more rapidly hone in on exploiting the best arm; furthermore, this 
effect is stronger for participants with high aspirations. I conclude that, by reducing 
the ambiguity of feedback from payoffs, high (but not moderate) aspiration levels 
may improve cumulative performance in a stable environment. 
Study 2: Unstable Environment with a Disruptive Shock 
In this study I introduce a disruptive shock that reshapes the payoff landscape 
between periods 30 and 31. Before the shock, the three arms returned uniformly 
distributed payoffs with means [25, 20, 15] for arms 1, 2, and 3, respectively (just as 
in Study 1). After the shock, the means change to [20, 15, 25]; thus the worst pre-
shock arm becomes the best post-shock arm, and the average payoff for the other two 
arms shifts downward (by 5 points each) so that the overall payoff landscape remains 
otherwise unchanged. All the arms have a constant interval of ±10 throughout the 
game. 
Before the shock, results for Study 2 replicate those for Study 1: participants 
in the high–aspiration level condition exploit the arm they believe is best significantly 
more often (M = 27.2, SD = 9.0) than do those in the moderate–aspiration level 
condition (M = 23.6, SD = 7.0; F = 10.31, p < 0.01); so as before, H1 is supported. 
H2a is supported because high-aspiration participants exploit what is objectively the 
best arm significantly more often (M = 15.9, SD = 5.1) than do participants with 
moderate aspirations (M = 14.2, SD = 4.6; F = 5.94, p = 0.02); H2b is supported 
because cumulative performance is significantly higher in the high–aspiration level 
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group (M = 651.8, SD = 49.1) than in the moderate–aspiration level group (M =633.6, 
SD = 44.3; F = 7.3, p < 0.01). 
Exploration-Exploitation Choices After the Shock. One implication of the 
adaptive learning model is that an environmental shock should have different effects 
on decision makers with high versus moderate aspirations. After the shock, high-
aspiration participants were less likely to choose the new best option (M = 5.0, SD = 
3.7) than were those with moderate aspirations (M = 7.5, SD = 4.1; F = 20.1, p < 
0.01) – supporting Hypothesis 3a. Cumulative performance after the shock is 
therefore significantly lower for participants in the high-aspiration condition (M = 
406.3, SD = 33.1) than for those in the moderate-aspiration condition (M = 416.4, 
SD = 36.2; F = 4.31, p < 0.05), which supports Hypothesis 3b.18  
Study 3: Unstable Environment with a Disruptive Shock and an Extended Post-
Shock Period 
In Study 2 I observe post-shock choices for only 20 periods (i.e., from period 31 to 
period 50). However, that duration may not be long enough to detect subjects’ 
adaptation to the new environment. I therefore replicate Study 2 but with a longer 
post-shock learning period. In this study, there are 30 periods before the shock (from 
period 1 to 30, same as Study 2) and 50 periods after the shock (from period 31 to 80, 
instead of 20 periods as in Study 2). 
 
18 I also ran this study with greater variance (±15) from the mean, so that the worst arm in the high-
aspiration condition returned a greater percentage of successes (15% instead of 5%). The results, which 
are qualitatively robust, have not been reported here owing to space constraints; they are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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Prior to the disruptive shock, results for Study 3 replicate those for Studies 1 
and 2 (see Table 2). Recall that, according to the adaptive learning model, an 
environmental shock affects decision makers differently depending on their 
respective aspiration levels. This study helps explicate the short- and long-term 
effects of the shock on learning behavior and choices. Expanding the post-shock 
period allowed us to compare behavioral patterns – namely, choices made in the 
periods shortly after the shock (periods 31–50) with choices made in periods long 
after the shock (periods 61–80). 
 [[ INSERT Figure 8 ABOUT HERE ]] 
In Studies 1–3 I tested the hypotheses. Now, to establish boundary conditions 
for our major findings, I explore also the impact of different types of environments. 
Thus Study 4 describes the effects of a positive (rather than a neutral) shock, and 
Studies 5a, 5b, 6a, and 6b examine different incentive structures. I also include a 
discussion of robustness checks in which I the re-ran Studies 1 and 3 when a no-
aspiration control condition is added. 
Boundary Conditions 
The sample characteristics for the studies described in this section were summarized 
above and can be found in Table 1. All results for these studies are summarized in 
Table 4. 
[[ INSERT Table 4 ABOUT HERE ]] 
Shock Type: Unstable Environment with a Disruptive, Positive Shock. In Study 4, I 
introduce a positive shock between period 30 and 31 that changes only the worst 
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arm’s payoff. Before the shock, the three arms returned uniformly distributed payoffs 
with means [25, 20, 15], but after the shock the means change to [25, 20, 30]. As in 
Study 2, the worst arm before the shock becomes the best arm afterwards; but unlike 
Study 2, the payoffs from choosing the other two arms remain unchanged. All the 
arms have a constant variance of ±10 throughout the game. The results mirror those 
reported in Study 2 and are summarized in Table 4. 
In comparing Study 2 with Study 4, I expect that the latter’s high–aspiration 
level participants will be more likely to continue choosing arm 1 (the previously best 
arm) than they were in Study 2. The reason is that, in Study 4, the payoff from arm 1 
(the best arm pre-shock) does not decline post-shock – as it does in Study 2 – and so 
participants have no incentive to re-engage in exploration. Our data reveal that, after 
the shock, high-aspiration participants do choose arm 1 more frequently in Study 4 
than in Study 2 (13.0 vs. 7.4; standard error SE = 0.72, t = 2.88, p < 0.01). (12.94 vs. 
10.76, SD=5.28 vs.5.67, f=4.67, p<=0.05) 
It is noteworthy also that, after the shock, Study 4’s high–aspiration level participants 
were less likely to choose arm 3 (worst pre-shock arm but best post-shock arm) than 
were their Study 2 counterparts (3.3 vs. 5.0; SE = 0.411, t = 4.13, p < 0.001) (3.3 vs. 
5.0, SD=3.5 vs 3.7, F=6.16, p<0.05). Thus cumulative performance post-shock is 
lower in Study 4 than in Study 2. In accordance with our expectations, the pre-shock 
choice patterns across these two studies do not exhibit any significant differences.19 
 
19 Because the assignment of participants to Study 2 versus Study 4 was not random, this comparison 
only uses the sample averages across studies. 
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Alternative Incentive Structures. Incentives play a leading role in individuals’ 
choices between exploration and exploitation. The incentive design employed in 
Studies 1–3 was meant to minimize the link between aspiration levels and 
performance by incentivizing strong performance via a rare, global bonus. Research 
has shown that winner-takes-all incentives may increase risk taking, which in this 
context would suggest a shift toward more exploration (Ederer and Manso, 2013; 
Manso, 2011). Even if the incentives discussed previously did indeed encourage more 
risk taking and exploration, the design was actually a rather conservative test of the 
hypotheses that instead predicted more exploitation. 
In order to explore the boundary conditions of incentive design in our set-up, I 
ran Studies 1 and 3 (again omitting Study 2, the shorter version of Study 3) with two 
alternative incentive structures each. All of these studies were run with a control 
condition under which participants could earn a bonus even though no aspiration level 
was specified. The actual aspiration levels were kept constant across incentive 
designs (i.e., in line with the results already reported): participants whose aspirations 
were high (resp. moderate) were requested to reach 25 (resp. 20) points per round or 
1,250 (resp. 1,000) cumulative points. 
The pandemic forced us to run these studies entirely via MTurk. Participants 
were paid a fixed fee for participation and were told that they could earn a 
performance-based bonus. The participant characteristics were broadly comparable to 
the initial MTurk Studies 1 and 3 as outlined above.  
In Studies 5a and 5b, participants could earn a fixed bonus for reaching the 
given (moderate or high) aspiration level of 1,250 or 1,000 cumulative payoff points. 
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I implemented the manipulation for high [resp. moderate] aspiration levels by 
instructing the participants as follows: “If you earn more than 1,250 [1,000] points in 
50 rounds, or average 25 [20] points per round, you will receive a bonus payment 
of $1 (and $0 bonus otherwise).” The control condition (no aspiration level) was 
worded thusly: “Remember, the more you earn the better off you are. If you earn 
more than average, you will receive a bonus payment of $1 (or $0 bonus otherwise).” 
In all other respects, Study 5a replicated Study 1 (a stable environment with 
50 rounds) and Study 5b replicated Study 3 – an unstable environment with a 
disruptive shock after round 30 and a total of 80 rounds ( just as in Study 3, the 
aspiration levels were scaled to 25 × 80 points or 20 × 80 points, respectively, for 
participants in the high– and moderate–aspiration level conditions). 
The results from Studies 5a and 5b are consistent with those from Studies 1 
and 3, respectively (see Table 4). The fixed-bonus incentive design ties performance 
more closely to the aspiration level and seems to reinforce the prevalence of that level 
in the minds of participants. Only H2b – our prediction that high–aspiration level 
participants would exhibit worse performance after the shock – was not supported 
under the fixed-bonus incentive design. This outcome may be due to the stronger 
performance focus in the fixed-bonus condition.  
In Studies 6a and 6b, the points earned by participants were converted into US 
dollars, without a threshold, via an exchange rate. In this incentive structure, the 
preceding aspiration level manipulation was replicated and emphasized what the 
previous manager had earned (1,250 or 1,000 points, depending on the aspiration 
level); the only change was incorporating a points–USD exchange rate. I 
53 
 
implemented the manipulation for high [resp. moderate] aspiration levels by 
instructing the participants as follows: “The points you earn over your tenure will be 
converted to USD, with a conversion rate of 1 point = $0.001 (e.g., if you earn 1,250 
[1,000] points you will get $1.25 [$1.00] bonus pay).” The control condition (no 
aspiration level) was worded in this way: “Remember, the more you earn the 
better off you are. The points you earn over your tenure will be converted to USD, 
with a conversion rate of 1 point = $0.001.” Study 6a otherwise replicated Study 1, 
and Study 6b replicated Study 3.  
The results in Table 4 show that this incentive design did not support our 
hypotheses. The only replicated effect is that participants in the high-aspiration 
condition tend to choose the truly best arm more frequently before the shock, but 
even this effect is rather weak. I interpret these results as evidence of participants’ 
focus shifting away from aspiration levels because the strong link between 
performance and reward incentivizes exactly the risk taking (and hence exploration) 
reported by prior research (e.g., Ederer and Manso, 2013; Manso, 2011).20 Hence one 
boundary condition for our findings is the need for an incentive design that supports – 
as in Studies 5a and 5b – rather than overrides aspiration levels. 
Robustness Check: No–Aspiration Level Control Condition. Our theory 
development and model are based on the differences resulting from moderate versus 
high aspiration levels. In addition, the main variable used to assess H1 relies on fitting 
the participant-generated data to our model. I therefore ran the initial set-up of studies 
 
20 It is also possible that the aspiration level manipulation was just too weak in Studies 6a and 6b since 
the exchange rate between conditions did not differ. 
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(Studies 1, 2, and 3) without a separate control condition. So in evaluating the 
robustness of our aspiration level manipulation, I re-ran Studies 1 and 3 with a no–
aspiration level control condition (as before, I omitted Study 2 since it is a shorter 
version of Study 3). 
This control condition was presented as follows: “Remember, the more you 
earn the better off you are.” Behavior under the control condition is very close, 
overall, to that under the moderate–aspiration level condition; this outcome confirms 
that feedback ambiguity in the study set-up was moderate (as it was designed to be). 
Analysis of the control condition alone shows that learning did take place in the 
absence of aspiration levels – and that it was, indeed, the high aspiration levels 
combined with reduced feedback ambiguity that resulted in greater exploitation, 




How individuals and organizations approach the trade-off between exploration and 
exploitation is an important and burgeoning area of scholarly inquiry. Whereas 
exploitation is essential for current performance, exploration is often required for 
long-term performance and even survival (Levinthal, 1997; Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996). Moreover, prior research suggests that exploration and exploitation activities 
are often in conflict (Benner and Tushman, 2003, 2015; March, 1991; Tushman and 
O’Reilly, 1996). Despite an abundance of scholarly research on how the exploration–
exploitation trade-off affects choices and learning from experience, I still know 
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relatively little about how that trade-off is influenced by the decision makers’ 
aspiration levels. 
In this paper, I tackle a relatively under-studied aspect of the exploration-
exploitation problem in management and organizations research, that of choice under 
uncertainty. Most prior work that considers how the aspiration performance gap 
influences exploration-exploitation decisions consider it from the vantage point of 
reinforcing or abandoning a reasonable well-known status-quo (Bromiley and Rau, 
2019; Greve and Gaba, 2017). In contrast, empirical work on choice under 
uncertainty, where individuals learn about the relative attractiveness of choices from 
feedback, tends to ignore how goals (or aspirations) influence this choice (Cohen et 
al, 2007).  
By combining two important (and well established) behavioral processes –
learning from feedback and the subjective categorization of feedback around the 
aspiration level – I offer novel predictions about how aspiration levels influence 
exploration-exploitation decisions. Drawing from behavioral and reference point 
theories, I argue that aspiration levels are likely to affect how subjects interpret 
feedback (i.e., as success versus failure). In line with adaptive learning theory, I argue 
that this interpretation of feedback affects subsequent sampling behavior and thereby 
exacerbates any preference related to the different choices.  
I then test the hypotheses arising from this model in a laboratory experiment 
that employs a multi-armed bandit task, which is the canonical model used for 
understanding how agents approach exploration and exploitation (Daw et al., 2006; 
Gittins, 1979). I find that under certain conditions a high aspiration level reduces 
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feedback ambiguity about the relative attractiveness of available choices; I theorize 
that this reduction in feedback ambiguity allows decision makers to develop greater 
strength of opinion which, in turn, leads to more exploitation. I also show that such an 
exploitation focus is beneficial in stable environments, but detrimental in unstable 
environments, when a shock alters the relative attractiveness of the available options. 
Thus I contribute to the literature by showing how aspiration levels and adaptive 
learning  jointly affect the choice between exploration and exploitation.  
Our theory is especially applicable to the case where aspirations are 
exogenous (e.g., determined by a peer group or by superiors or external stakeholders) 
and where decision makers face choices whose performance consequences are not 
known ex ante and must therefore be learned from repeated feedback. This is the 
environment that March (1991) described in his seminal paper on the trade-off. 
Consider, as in the Introduction, a pharmaceutical company’s R&D manager who 
makes resource allocation decisions about investing in uncertain technologies. This 
manager learns about the relative attractiveness of these different research programs 
by investing in them over some time period and then observing the outcomes. I posit 
that, in this case, a manager with a relatively higher aspiration level is more likely 
(than a manager with moderate aspirations) to exploit, which may lead to higher 
performance outcomes. However, such a manager is also less likely to notice 
technology breakthroughs that improve the payoffs of previously less attractive 
choices.21 In the case of exogenously imposed – rather than personal, intrinsic – 
 
21 This generalization may not hold at extremely high aspiration levels (i.e., those above any currently 
available choices) or at aspiration levels so low that they are satisfied by all choices. In these instances, 
feedback ambiguity is not lower for one aspiration level as opposed to another aspiration level. Thus, I 




aspiration levels, the theory and data presented here should have fairly broad business 
applicability.  
I consider the impact of aspiration levels in an adaptive learning context, 
where I account not only for a single instance of choice (i.e., a single selection from a 
set of known options) but also for repetitive choice. The results show that increased 
aspiration levels actually lead to more exploitation and that the agents who do explore 
end up considering a narrower set of choices. The implication is that while leaders 
who challenge their organizations with ambitious goals may unleash exploration in 
some parts of the organization, they are actually making other parts of the 
organization more conservative. For example, a high aspiration level may encourage 
the engineering or marketing department to try out new ideas, yet the capital 
budgeting process may hinder that exploration by dictating safer alternatives. So in 
order for goal setting and/or aspiration levels to render exploration both desirable and 
fruitful, the goals must be sufficiently ambitious that they trigger search for new 
alternatives – that is, rather than a choice between existing ones. Nevertheless, Sitkin 
et al. (2011) and Gary et al. (2017) stressed that each of these responses comes with 
its own drawbacks. 
Our findings may seem counterintuitive when one considers the prevailing 
view in research on the aspiration-performance link, which has largeky focused on 
the relative attractiveness of a well-known status quo vis a vis uncertain alternatives 
(Greve and Gaba, 2017; Ordóñez et al., 2009a, 2009b). By instead framing this link 
as a problem of choice under uncertainty I were able to explore how aspiration levels 
may affect learning and the explore–exploit decision as well as the interpretation of 
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payoff feedback as either success or failure. Such a subjective interpretation affects 
subsequent sampling decisions, and it may reduce the rates of exploration and 
exploitation asymmetrically depending on whether the decision maker has high or 
moderate aspirations. Although our agent-based simulation and lab studies allowed us 
to make concrete predictions about the interplay between aspiration levels and 
adaptive learning about the exploration–exploitation trade-off, I believe that this 




List of Figures for Essay A 
Figure 1. Thought experiment: Two decision makers and two arms 
                                   Panel (a)                                                                             Panel (b) 
              
 
 
Figure 2. Probability of exploration and choosing each arm: 50 periods, no disruptive 
shock 
 






Figure 3. Standard deviation of difference in beliefs about arms’ payoffs
 
Notes: The smaller the standard deviation of belief difference between two arms, the less the agent’s 
feedback ambiguity about whether one arm is better than the other. High aspiration levels always lead 
to a lower standard deviation of these differences between arms. Therefore, high-aspiration agents 




Figure 4. Probability of choosing each arm: Disruptive shock after period 30 
 
Notes: A high aspiration level leads to a strong preference for the best arm with little or no exploration 
of inferior alternatives. When a disruptive shock alters the payoff structure, this strong preference 





Figure 5. Experimental setup: payoff distributions and feedback ambiguity
 
Notes: Panel (a) illustrates the payoff distributions of the three investment options that underlie Studies 
1, 2, 3, and 4. Panels (b) and (c) overlay the “success” and “failure” interpretations made by the 
decision makers based on their respective aspiration levels. Panel (b) (resp. (c)) shows the 
interpretations for a moderate (resp. high) aspiration level of 20 (resp. 25) payoff points. A comparison 
of these two panels reveals that the feedback ambiguity for all arms is much reduced in the high 
relative to the moderate aspiration condition. 
 
Figure 6.  Success rate for each arm (subject–round level), Study 1 
 
Notes: For each subject and round, the graphs plot the distribution of success rates in the prior round 
across the three arms. For example, a participant who had two experiences above aspiration and 
three experiences below aspiration – that is, from choosing an arm prior to the focal period – has 
experienced a success rate of 0.4 for that arm. A high aspiration level (but not a moderate one) leads 
to consistent feedback of failure from the worst arm (panel (c)).  
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Figure 7. Average feedback difference and probability of exploiting the best arm 
as a function of aspiration level (coefficients from Table 4, Model [5]) 
 
Note: For a given increase in belief difference between the best and the worst arm, high–aspiration 
level participants (dashed line) exhibit a greater increase in their probability of exploiting the best 
arm than do medium–aspiration level participants (solid line). 
 
 






List of Tables for Essay A 
Table 1. Sample characteristics for main studies 
 
Notes: The sample size N corresponds to usable data, and the total number of recruited participants is 
given in parentheses. The slight reduction in each study’s number of subjects is due to some 
participants failing to fill out all parts of the questionnaire or failing to “finalize” the main game. In the 
former case we performed, when possible analyses on each sample (both the full and incomplete ones); 
no significant differences were observed. The MTurk studies were not regionally restricted; the BART 





Table 2. ANOVA results for main studies 
 
Note: This table reports sample means with standard errors in parentheses. The “Difference between conditions” column reports the ANOVA results. 
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Table 3. Study 1: Generalized linear mixed model of exploiting the best arm 
 Model 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
High aspiration  0.138**  0.211*** –0.001 
  (0.054)  (0.055) (0.119) 
Belief difference between best and worst arm   0.460*** 0.467*** 0.415*** 
   (0.032) (0.032) (0.041) 
Belief difference between best and worst arm     0.106** 
 × High aspiration     (0.053) 
Last round performance 0.012*** 0.012*** –0.002 –0.002 –0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Average past performance –0.029** -0.029** –0.047*** –0.046*** –0.048*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Round 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Time spent this round (seconds) –0.010 -0.010 –0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age –0.000 -0.000 –0.003 –0.003 –0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male –0.003 -0.009 –0.004 –0.014 –0.009 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) 
BART –0.018*** -0.016** –0.017** –0.014** –0.013** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Constant 0.975*** 0.833** 1.024*** 0.800** 0.916** 
 (0.369) (0.368) (0.376) (0.370) (0.372) 
Observations 9,457  9,457 9,457 9,457 
Number of groups 193   193 193 193 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
66 
 
Table 4. ANOVA results for boundary condition studies 
 
Note: This table reports sample means with standard errors in parentheses. The “Difference 
between conditions” column reports the ANOVA results.  
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ESSAY B: Responding to environment turbulence – a bandit model 
Introduction 
Committing to an appropriate exploration strategy is critical for 
organizational performance; either over- or under-exploring leads to 
underperformance and organizational failures (March, 1991). Yet, how much 
exploration is appropriate, is subject to the environmental dynamism. 
Organizational response to increased environmental dynamism is an important 
question (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005; Sørensen & Stuart, 2000; Stieglitz, Knudsen, 
& Becker, 2016; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985): when the environment dynamism 
increases, should organizations focus more (or less) on exploration? This question 
is relevant for managers. For example, should traditional auto makers, in response 
to the volatile oil price, invest more in developing electronic or hybrid vehicles that 
is beyond their existing knowledge about combustion engines? Should MNEs 
explore new markets when facing increased turbulence in global economic growth? 
Existing literature on organizational response to environmental dynamism has 
provided mixed suggestions. On one hand, some scholars (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 
1995; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006; March, 1991) suggest that 
environmental dynamism makes existing knowledge obsolete, and organizations 
need to renew their knowledge by increasing exploration. Exploration facilitates the 
identification of emerged opportunities in a dynamic environment, thus helps 
organizations’ adaptation to the new environment (Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 
2009; Zahra, 1996). On the other hand, some scholars also argue that increased 
dynamism undermines the value of exploration (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Marino, 
Aversa, Mesquita, & Anand, 2015; Posen & Levinthal, 2012). Posen and Levinthal 
(2012) illustrate the problem of “chasing a moving target” and challenged the 
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conventional wisdom about the positive relationship between environmental 
dynamism and exploration: the knowledge generated by exploration will be quickly 
eroded in a dynamic environment, thus organization needs to reduce exploration as 
a response. The opposing viewpoints pose not only conflicting theoretical 
predictions, but also conflicting managerial guidelines for practitioners (Stieglitz et 
al., 2016). 
Noticing that the existing literature uses single construct for exploration 
strategy, we revisit the “chasing a moving target” problem and reconcile the 
opposing viewpoints by disentangling two distinctive aspects of exploration - 
intensity and width. Specifically, exploration intensity refers to the “how much” 
questions: the amount of attention and resources allocated to exploration, such as 
R&D intensity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) or number of new product introduced 
(Greve, 2007). Exploration width refers to the “how” question: the amount of 
attention and resources allocated to distant, unfamiliar and risky exploration (versus 
less distant, unfamiliar and risky exploration), such as boundary-spanning 
exploration (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) or new product that are meaningfully 
distinct from existing ones (Danneels & Sethi, 2011). Using a computational model, 
we examine how organization should respond to increased environmental 
dynamism. We find that, if an organization is able to disentangle exploration 
intensity and width, it can effectively address the problem of “chasing a moving 
target”: not only the optimal exploration (both intensity and width) will 
monotonically increase as the environment becomes dynamic, the organizations 
will also achieve superior performance in a dynamic environment than others who 
are unable to disentangle exploration intensity and width. 
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Through our model, we highlight two observations. First, in a dynamic 
environment where past experience has little indication for the future performance, 
exploration width needs to be high – i.e. all options should be explored regardless 
the old knowledge built upon past experience – to ensure exploration efficiency and 
prevent inefficient search misguided by past experience; yet the exploration 
intensity should be moderate to balance exploration and exploitation. Entangling 
exploration intensity and width leads to the dilemma of, either inefficient 
exploration among narrow options or allocation of obsessive resources to 
exploration, causing the problem of “chasing a moving target”. 
Second, when an organization focuses more on exploration, it increases two 
types of costs to generate new knowledge - (i) opportunity cost of exploration and 
(ii) cost of switching between options. As Posen and Levinthal (2012) pointed out, 
increased dynamism quickly erodes new knowledge generated through exploration, 
making exploration less valuable. However, we highlight that increased dynamism 
also reduces the opportunity cost of exploration – the payoff difference between 
exploitation and exploration. As old knowledge is eroded by the increased 
dynamism, exploiting the old knowledge will be less beneficial, and each exploring 
action will incur less opportunity cost. The conversion of opportunity cost to 
knowledge is more effective in a dynamic environment than in a stable environment, 
if exploration width is appropriate. On the other hand, dynamism increases the 
likelihood of negative experience from exploitation, triggering more passive search 
– switching action even the organization exploits – and raising switching cost.  
Our findings provide theoretical reconciliation and managerial guidance to 
how organizations should respond in a dynamic environment. If the switching cost 
is minimal and an organization is able to use separate strategies to disentangle 
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exploration intensity and width, the organization should do so and focus more on 
exploration in a dynamic environment. Otherwise, exploration will be ineffective, 
and the organization should focus more on exploitation in a dynamic environment. 
Literature Review 
Environment dynamic refers to the unpredictability of environmental changes 
(Dess & Beard, 1984). It should be differentiated from other aspects of 
environmental change, such as speed and munificence (Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 
1974; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005): an environmental change can be slow, beneficial, 
yet unpredictable, imposing administrative challenges for the organization and its 
decision maker (March & Simon, 1958). Specifically, organizations face two 
challenges in a dynamic environment. First, the organization’s existing knowledge 
becomes obsolete due to the unpredictable change in environment (Sørensen & 
Stuart, 2000). Relying on the obsolete knowledge will lead to inferior performance 
and organizational failures. Secondly, when the environment is dynamic, 
opportunities emerge in the forms of new customer demands, availability of new 
technology or the emergence of a new market (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Gavetti, 
Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005). Identification of the emerged opportunities leads a 
better adaptation and organizational success. 
Theoretical arguments and formal models suggest that focusing on 
exploration is an effective organizational response to the obsolete knowledge and 
emerging opportunities in a dynamic environment. Using a computational model, 
Kim and Rhee (2009) illustrate that it is important for an organization in a dynamic 
environment to allow internal variety and encourage its organizational members to 
experiment with radically new knowledge and update the old knowledge. Davis, 
Eisenhardt and Bingham (2009) also demonstrate that in an dynamic environment, 
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organizations should impose less rules and structures driving efficiency, but instead, 
provide more flexibility and open up the organization to a wide range of 
opportunities. 
These theoretical arguments are further supported by empirical evidences that 
organizations should focus more on exploration a dynamic environment. Jansen, 
Van Den Bosch and Volberda (2006) found that pursuing exploratory innovation is 
more effective in a dynamic environment, leading to better financial performance. 
Based on the evidence of 279 manufacturing firms in Standard & Poor 500, Uotila 
and his colleagues (2009) found that exploration effort is more important and 
profitable when the technological dynamism is high. Garg, Watlers and Priem (2003) 
found that the CEO’s attention to innovation is associated with better performance 
in a dynamic environment, while the CEO’s attention to efficiency is associated 
with better performance is a stable environment. Larraneta, Zahra & Gonzalez 
(2014) found that new ventures grow faster from pursuing strategic variety by 
exploring multiple strategic actions, especially in a dynamic environment. Wang 
and Li (2008) also found that the negative effect of under-exploration is stronger in 
a dynamic environment, yet the negative effect of over-exploration is weaker in a 
dynamic environment. These evidences reaffirm the managerial conventional 
wisdom: organizations should focus more on exploration in a dynamic environment. 
However, such conventional wisdom is not without theoretical challenges 
from management (Posen & Levinthal, 2012), sociology (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) 
and economics (Keller & Rady, 1999) literature, questioning the value of 
exploration in dynamic environment. Particularly, Posen and Levinthal (P&L) use 
a multi-arm bandit model to illustrate the problem of “chasing a moving target”: 
when the environment is dynamic, organizations are better off avoiding chasing the 
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moving target by exploration. In a dynamic environment, although exploration 
facilitates the creation of new knowledge and identification of emerged 
opportunities, new knowledge and opportunities are quickly eroded, eliminating the 
expected return of exploration (Posen & Levinthal, 2012). Thus, organization may 
need to focus less on exploration and more on exploitation in a dynamic 
environment.  
Stieglitz, Knudsen and Becker (2016) highlight the importance to reconcile 
the converging theoretical arguments and conflicting predictions. Using a multi-
arm bandit model similar to P&L, they disentangle three dimensions of 
environmental dynamism – direction, magnitude and frequency – to provide 
boundary conditions for the predictions. However, their theoretical model has two 
shortcomings. First, one of their main predictions contradicts to empirical evidences. 
Stieglitz and his colleagues propose that increased magnitude of environmental 
change rewards exploration, and organization should focus more on exploration if 
the magnitude of change is high. In contrast, Marino and his colleagues (2015) 
found that when the magnitude of technological regulation change is high, Formula 
One teams should focus less on exploration as the value of exploration cannot be 
realized. Such contradiction could be caused by Stieglitz and his colleagues’ model 
specification, that an increase in the magnitude of change will increase the payoff 
variance across the options, indirectly affect the exploration behavior22. Second, the 
selection process in Stieglitz and his colleagues’ model penalizes early explorations. 
Organizations that explores more face short-term performance consequences in the 
 
22In their model, the payoff variance across options increases when magnitude of change 
increases. Yet, the organizations engage in a payoff-sensitive choice/exploration strategy 
(softmax). For the same exploration strategy, increased payoff variance across options reduces 




early stages and may potentially exit from the population. This selection process 
creates a bias in the population that favors risk-averse behaviors (Denrell & March, 
2001), and potentially contributes to their conclusion that best-performing 
organizations generally focus more on exploitation and less on exploration in 
dynamic environments (except high magnitude of change). 
In this paper we revisit the “chasing a moving target” problem from a different 
perspective, by disentangling aspects of exploration. Exploration refers to the 
pursuit of new knowledge and unknown alternatives (Levinthal & March, 1993) 
and involves “search, variation, risk-taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, and innovation” (March, 1991, p. 71). In contrast, exploitation refers to 
the implementation of old knowledge and known alternatives (Levinthal & March, 
1993), and involves “refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, 
implementation and execution” (March, 1991, p. 71). A balance between 
exploration and exploitation is important organizational success and survival, as 
exclusively concentrating on exploration or exploitation undermines organizational 
performance over the long term (Junni, Sarala, Taras, & Tarba, 2013; O'Reilly & 
Tushman, 2008, 2013; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). One-sided focus on 
exploitation enhances short-term performance at the cost of long-term performance, 
as it can cause the firm to fail to discover potential opportunities. On the other hand, 
one-sided focus on exploration enhances the organization’s knowledge at the cost 
of current performance, and it can trap the organization in endless cycles of 
instability. 
There are two aspects of exploration that have been conceptualized and 
operationalized. First, as exploration competes organizational resources and 
managerial attention with exploitation (March, 1991), organizations need to decide 
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the exploration intensity: amount of resources allocated between exploration and 
exploitation, on decisions such as budget allocation (Coen & Maritan, 2011), 
managerial focus (Garg et al., 2003), business activities (Uotila et al., 2009),  and 
alliance formation (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin, Yang, & Demirkan, 2007). 
Second, organizations need to decide on the exploration width: how those resources 
are used, on decisions such as search distance (Levinthal, 1997), search scope 
(Katila & Ahuja, 2002) and boundary span (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). 
It is unclear whether individuals can behaviorally disentangle the two aspects 
of explorations. On one hand, an individuals’ exploration tendencies, both 
exploration intensity and width, are constrained by individual preferences 
(Schoemaker, 1990), past experiences (March, 1996), task incentives (Manso, 2011) 
and social norms (Hofstede, 1983). On the other hand, Laureiro-Martinez and her 
colleagues (2015) demonstrate that the attentional control region of human brains 
(i.e. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and frontopolar cortex) are responsible for 
switching between exploration and exploitation, while brain regions invovled with 
the reward-related uncertainty and attentional control are responsible for 
exploration activity. 
Regardless the behavioral plausibility to disentangle exploration intensity and 
width at individual level, organizations are capable of effectively disentangling 
them through deliberate designs. For example, using an organization structure that 
separates exploration and exploitation activities (Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010), 
an organization can strategize its exploration intensity by allocating appropriate 
budget and manpower to its exploration unit (e.g. R&D unit), while strategize its 
exploration width by directing appropriate technological search within the 
exploration unit. Similarly, temporally separating exploration and exploitation 
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could also disentangle exploration intensity and width: organizations can decide the 
amount of time they should focus on exploration (and exploitation), and when they 
explore, they will strategize the search space. 
In the following session, we revisit the “chasing a moving target” problem 
with a multi-arm bandit simulation with specifications similar to P&L. 
Simulation Model Specification 
The multi-arm bandit model, taking the analogy from multi-arm slot machines, 
has been extensively used by organization scholars to represent the trade-off 
between exploration and exploitation (e.g. Aggarwal et al., 2017; Lee & Puranam, 
2016; Posen & Levinthal, 2012; Puranam & Swamy, 2016). In this model, the arms 
of the bandit represent the discrete choices an organization faces such as those 
between different products, technologies, or investment options, with payoff 
distributions unknown to the organization ex-ante. In each time period, the agent 
(organization) makes a choice regarding which arm to invest in, and receives a 
payoff feedback. This payoff feedback provides information regarding the 
attractiveness of the choice, which in turn informs future choices. Our model setup 
builds closely on the models by Posen and Levinthal (2012), Stieglitz, Knudsen and 
Becker (2016), and Lee and Puranam (2016). Below, we describe the three 
components of our model: (1) task environment, (2) learning process, and (3) choice 
strategy. 
Task Environment: The task environment of a multi-arm bandit model 
consists of N discrete options (i.e. arms). Each period, the organization chooses one 
arm and receives a payoff 𝜋𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜖 in which 𝜋𝑛,𝑡 is the mean payoff of the arm, and 
𝜖 is a normally distributed noise with zero mean and 𝜎2 variance. The initial mean 
payoff of the n-th arm, 𝜋𝑛,1, is drawn from a standard normal distribution with zero 
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mean and unit variance. In such setup, an organization that blindly makes choices 
will achieve an expected performance of zero. 
To model environmental dynamism, we use a stochastic process on 𝜋𝑛,𝑡 with 
two parameters: frequency of change 𝜌 ∈ [0,1] and magnitude of change 𝜇 ∈ [0,1]. 
Specifically, the mean payoff of an arm follows the following process: 
{
𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜇)𝜋𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜗√1 − (1 − 𝜇)2;     𝜌
𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑛,𝑡;                                        (1 − 𝜌)
 
in which 𝜌 is the probability with which the mean payoff of an arm is changed 
from previous period, and 𝜗 are a normally distributed i.i.d. with zero mean and 
unit variance, identical to the normally distribution form which the initial mean 
payoff 𝜋𝑛,1 is drawn. When the magnitude is at its maximum 𝜇 = 1, 𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 = 𝜗 if 
a change happened, that is, the mean payoff of the arm is redrawn from the initial 
normal distribution. When the magnitude is at its minimum 𝜇 = 0, 𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑛,𝑡 
regardless of change. Our manipulation of environment dynamism is slightly 
different from Stieglitz and his colleagues’ model but has two desirable 
characteristics (see Appendix 1 for proof). First, the mean payoff of the N arms will 
be normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance, consistently at any point 
of time. This characteristic ensures any changes in the organizations’ choices are 
caused by the choice strategy rather than the changed payoff distribution across the 
arms over time. Secondly, frequency and magnitude of change jointly determine 
dynamism, (i.e. the unpredictability) of the mean payoff of arms over time. 
Formally, the predictability of the mean payoff of the arm over time can be reflected 
as the correlation between 𝜋𝑛,𝑡 and  𝜋𝑛,𝑡+∆𝑡 is 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜋𝑛,𝑡, 𝜋𝑛,𝑡+∆𝑡) = (1 − 𝜌𝜇)
∆𝑡. 
Learning Process: When an arm is chosen, the organization receives a 
performance feedback and learns about the attractiveness of the arm. To model the 
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learning process, we follow the prior literature (Aggarwal, Posen, & Workiewicz, 
2017; Lee & Puranam, 2016; March, 1991; Posen & Levinthal, 2012) and use the 
average learning rule, that is, the organization estimates the attractiveness of an arm 







Here 𝑝𝑖,𝑛 represents the realized payoff of the i
th trial by the organization, and 
𝑞𝑛 is the estimated payoff (belief) for this arm after it has been tried k times. 
Choice Strategy: With the beliefs of the arms formed, the organizations now 
choose which arm to pull. We examine two different choice strategies here: e-
greedy and softmax. 
The simplest choice strategy is always to be greedy and choose the arm with 
the highest belief (Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, & Fischer, 2002), that is, a pure exploitation 
strategy that always exploits the current knowledge for maximized immediate 
payoff. Epsilon-greedy, or e-greedy, is an alternative that randomly explores 
amongst all arms with equal chance with a probability 𝜀, and chooses the arm with 
the highest belief with probability (1 − 𝜀) (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Tokic & Palm, 
2011). 𝜀 is the exploration parameter in the e-greedy rule. 
A more sophisticated choice strategy is the softmax rule (Posen & Levinthal, 
2012) (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014; Puranam, Stieglitz, Osman, & Pillutla, 2015). 
The probability of choosing an arm is defined as: 










in which 𝜏 > 0 , also known as temperature, is the exploration parameter and 
represents the sensitivity of choice probability to the difference in beliefs. When the 
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τ is very small, the organization is sensitive to value difference – even a small 
difference in beliefs results in a large difference in the probability of choosing the 
arms – thus, the agent is highly exploitative. When the τ is large, the organization 
is insensitive to value difference and thus is highly explorative. 
A major difference between e-greedy and softmax is how exploration, 
particularly exploration intensity and width, is governed by the exploration 
parameter 𝜀 and 𝜏. In the e-greedy rule, exploration parameter 𝜀 only governs the 
exploration intensity: the rate of exploration – choices not exploiting the arm with 
the best belief – depends on 𝜀. Exploration width on the other hand is always high 
and independent from 𝜀 , and all arms are equally explored whenever the 
organization explores. In the softmax rule, exploration parameter 𝜏 governs both 
exploration intensity and width. If 𝜏 is small, the rate of exploration is low and 
whenever the organization explores, it is more likely to explore the next-best 
believed arm than the worst believed arm. If 𝜏 is large, the rate of exploration is 
high and whenever the organization explores, it explores widely: all arms are 
explored with an (almost) equal likelihood. Posen and Levinthal (2012) argues that 
this difference is an “important undesirable feature” (p.590) of e-greedy rule, 
dismissing the e-greedy rule as it is inferior than softmax. However, we will 
illustrate otherwise in our analysis. 
Another difference between e-greedy and softmax is behavioral plausibility. 
Softmax rule has been found to effectively describe how individuals make choices 
in trial-and-error learning situations (Camerer & Hua Ho, 1999; Daw, O'doherty, 
Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). Daw and his colleagues (2006) found that 
individuals make choices in a value sensitive manner, and softmax describes such 
behaviors better than e-greedy. However, the superior behavioral plausibility of 
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softmax rule at micro-level may not hold at the macro level for organizations. 
Organizations could also effectively use organizational culture (Sørensen, 2002), 
design (Fang, Lee, & Schilling, 2010), employment (Groysberg & Lee, 2009) and 
incentive schemes (Manso, 2011) to intervene its members’ sensitivity to values 
and exploration behaviors. An organization (e.g. Alphabet) that structurally 
separates exploration and exploitation activities could embrace cultures and 
incentives for its exploration unit that drive wide explorations of moonshot projects, 
while balancing exploration and exploitation by allocating appropriate resources 
between the units (Lavie et al., 2010). Alternatively, an organization that temporally 
separates exploration and exploitation activities could embrace cultures and 
incentives that facilitate wide exploration in the exploration phases, and then transit 
to exploitation (Lavie et al., 2010). In our formal model, e-greedy rule is a proxy to 
temporal separation: in the exploration periods, the organization embraces a culture, 
design, employment or incentive that is “completely insensitive” to values; in the 
exploitation periods, the organization switches to a culture, design, employment or 
incentive that is “completely sensitive” to values (Posen & Levinthal, 2012, p. 590). 
The organization with the e-greedy rule only needs to decide the temporal ratio (i.e. 
parameter 𝜀) between exploration and exploitation.  
Analysis and Results 
To make our analysis comparative to the prior literature (Posen & Levinthal, 
2012; Stieglitz et al., 2016), we operationalize the model by setting N=10 armed 
bandit model. The initial belief about each arm is netural and uniformly set to zero. 
Performance is measured as the average payoff per round over 500 periods. For the 
baseline analysis, we set the magnitude of change 𝜇 = 1 and systematically vary 
the frequency of 𝜌. In such setup, when the mean payoff of an arm is changed, it is 
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a completely redrawn from initial normal distribution, similar to P&L. We then 
systematically vary exploration parameters 𝜏  and 𝜀  to identify the optimal 
exploration strategy that maximizes the performance 23 . For each exploration 
parameter under each environment dynamism, we report the average performance 
over 50,000 simulations. 
EXPERIMENT 0: Posen and Levinthal 2012 revisited 
Figure 1A shows the optimized performance when an appropriate exploration 
strategy is employed. As expected, for both softmax and e-greedy rules, the 
optimized performance decreases when the dynamism increases. Surprisingly, the 
“undesirable” (Posen & Levinthal, 2012, p. 590) e-greedy rule, although performs 
worse in the stable environments where the frequency of change is below 2%, 
outperforms the softmax rule when the dynamic environments where the frequency 
of change is above 2%. 
INSERT FIGURE 1A, 1B ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1B shows the optimal exploration strategy for both decision rules. As 
suggested by P&L, optimal exploration parameter under softmax rule decreases 
when the dynamism increases in dynamic environments (𝜌>=0.5%), and 
organizations should focus less on exploration. However, when choices are guided 
by e-greedy rule, the optimal exploration parameter increases when the dynamism 
increases, contradict to P&L’s prediction. Figure 1A and Figure 1B suggest: (1) 
organizations in a dynamic environment should adapt an e-greedy decision rule, and 
(2) P&L’s observation does not hold for the e-greedy rule, that organizations with 
 
23 𝜏 is set to [0.01, 1.0] with intervals of 0.01, and 𝜀 is set to [0.01, 1.0] with intervals of 0.01. Such 
range is sufficiently large such that the optimal exploration strategy falls within the range, and 
fine-grain enough that the result is consistent. Robustness checks on the range and fine-
graininess does not change the qualitative results. 
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an e-greedy rule should focus on exploration, rather than exploitation in a dynamic 
environment. There are several explanations on why P&L’s proposed mechanism 
could not explain the optimal exploration strategy for e-greedy rule when dynamism 
increases. First, P&L’s only focuses on the mechanism of (diminishing) value of 
exploration, without looking into the cost of exploration. A wholistic view requires 
investigations on both benefit and cost of exploration. Second, there is a 
fundamental difference on how exploration is conducted between softmax and e-
greedy rule, that the “chasing moving target” is a problem only for the softmax rule, 
but not for the e-greedy rule (see Appendix 2 for detailed comments about P&L’s 
mechanism). 
 
Experiment 1: Organization Structures 
In the baseline model, we compared softmax rule to e-greedy rule. Prior 
literature has suggested individual decision makers behave in softmax rule, rather 
than a value-insensitive e-greedy rule. To achieve the approximate to e-greedy, we 
use a multi-agent organization design. 
Organization structure: When an organization has multiple agents, there are 
different designs to achieve balance between exploration and exploitation. In this 
paper, we contrast separation versus non-separation of exploration and exploitation, 
which we model as follows:  
Non-separated design: In the non-separated design, the balance between 
exploration and exploitation is achieved at individual level (i.e. contextual 
ambidexterity), and thus in this organization as one where each individual in the 
organization balances her choices between exploration and exploitation activities 
(see figure 1). We model the organization with J agents such that each of these 
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agents have the same exploration propensity (or temperature τ). Thus, in an 
organization with J agents, the organization can tune the balance at the individual 
level and let all agents have the appropriate, intermediate temperature 𝜏𝑗. This can 
be achieved in several ways in the real world, such as by setting up an incentive 
scheme that properly promote exploration and exploitation for all employees or by 
implementing an HR policy of hiring agents with the desired exploration 
propensity24. 
Structurally separated design: In the separated design, some agents explore, 
and other agents exploit. The organization achieves a balance between exploration 
and exploitation by allocating the appropriate number of agents to either explorative 
or exploitative roles (see figure 1). We model this by assigning a high value of τ to 
a fraction 𝑥 of the J agents in the organization, whereas the remaining (1- 𝑥) fraction 
of agents have a very low value of τ. Again, we expect that intermediate values of 
𝑥 will outperform very high or very low values. 
In the baseline experiment, there are two types of organizations. In 
structurally separated organizations, 10𝑥  agents focus on explorative activities, 
with a 𝜏𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1, and 10(1 − 𝑥) agents focus on exploitative activities, with a 
𝜏𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡=0.002.
25 Therefore, there are 11 possible configurations of the structurally 
separated organizations (𝑥 = 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, … 0.9, 1.0), and peak performance (and 
thus balance) is achieved by tuning the portion of exploration agents𝑥.  
 
24 Organizations in Posen and Levinthal’s (2012) model are a special case of non-separated design 
with one single agent. 
25 We set 𝜏𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒=1, which is large enough to represent strong exploration. Robustness tests with 
different values of 𝜏𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒  provide qualitatively similar results. As suggested by Posen and 
Levinthal (2012), we set 𝜏𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡=0.002 to avoid infinite values in equation (2), yet sufficiently 
represent a pure exploitation strategy. For example, with two arms with beliefs of 0.30 and 0.29, 
the probability of choosing the first one is 99.3%, and the latter is less than 0.7%. Tests 
𝜏𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡=0.01 and 𝜏𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡=0.005 show our results are robust. 
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In non-separated organizations, all agents engage in both explorative and 
exploitative activities. All agents have an identical temperature 𝜏𝑗 (a constraint we 
drop in robustness). Peak performance is achieved by tuning the value of 𝜏𝑗 from 
0.002 to 1.0. By setting the smallest tuning interval at 0.002, there are 500 possible 
configurations (𝜏𝑗 = 0.002, 0.004 … 0.998, 1.0). 
Figure 2 indicates the accumulated performance for different values of 
exploration parameter (proportion of exploration agents for structurally separated 
organizations; temperature 𝜏𝑗 for the non-separated organizations). Both types of 
organizations can achieve balance: structurally separated organizations’ peak 
performance of 448 is achieved when one agent explores, and the other nine agents 
exploit. Non-separated organizations’ achieve a peak performance of 377 when the 
temperature τ=0.04. Thus, in this environment, structural separation outperforms 
non-separation at balance. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Before exploring the contingencies under which this result holds, we attempt 
to understand the mechanism that underlies this result. First, we compare 
accumulated exploration cost against exploration parameter for these two 
organizations, as shown in Figure 3A. Exploration, by definition, is choosing an 
arm that is not optimal based on current belief. Therefore, exploration cost for each 
agent 𝑗 at each time period 𝑡 is the opportunity cost of pulling an arm other than the 
best-believed arm, formally ?̅?𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑  − ?̅?𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 . If an agent pulls the best-
believed arm, he/she exploits in this round and the exploration cost is zero. 
Cumulative exploration cost is the exploration cost summed over all agents across 
all time periods for a given organization configuration. From figure 3A, we see that 
exploration cost increases monotonically with increasing exploration parameter in 
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both designs, as expected. In Figure 3B, we plot the accumulated performance over 
accumulated exploration cost, and we can observe that structurally separated 
organization outperforms non-separation at any given exploration cost, and 
especially when the balance is achieved.26  
This suggests that the organization with a structurally separated design 
converts exploration cost to performance more effectively than the organization 
with a non-separated design. The purpose of exploration is to learn about the task 
environment and identify potential higher payoff choices for exploitation in the 
future. Therefore, exploration cost is spent to build knowledge that facilitates future 
exploitation. We measure the organization’s knowledge as how close the best-
believed arm’s mean payoff is to the actual best payoff arm, formally 
?̅?𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 − ?̅?𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 , ranging from 0  (best knowledge) to −1  (worst 
knowledge). Our measure of knowledge builds on a similar measure suggested by 
Lee and Puranam (2016); but unlike their dichotomous measure, we use a 
continuous measure. Our measure not only considers the match between the best-
believed and best-actual arms, but also considers how “wrong” the belief is. We can 
formally explain performance as function of knowledge and exploration cost in a 
bandit problem as follows:  
𝐸(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) = 𝐸(?̅?𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 − 0.5)  
= 𝐸(?̅?𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 0.5 + (?̅?𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 − ?̅?𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙) − (?̅?𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑  −
?̅?𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑))  
 
26 In Figure 2, we cannot make any direct comparison between these two organization designs at 
any given X-axis coordinate. This is because for the non-separated organization, the X axis 
denotes the temperature of the agents; in the separated organization, the X axis is the percentage of 
agents who are exploring. These two cannot be collapsed into a single ‘exploration’ parameter. 
Exploration cost provides a uniform handle that we can use to compare these two organization 
designs, plotted in Figure 3B. 
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= 𝐸(?̅?𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙) − 0.5 + 𝐸(𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒) −
𝐸(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)                       (3)  
𝐸(?̅?𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙) is a constant, about 0.831 in this set-up, and performance can be 
explained as spending exploration cost to build knowledge. Table 1 shows the 
accumulated performance, accumulated exploration cost, and average knowledge 
for the ‘balanced’ configuration of the separated and the non-separated organization 
designs respectively. For these two configurations, we also tabulate the number of 
exploration and exploitation pulls, and which arms were chosen when the agents 
explored.  
INSERT FIGURES 3A, 3B AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 1 illustrates the mechanism that underlies the superiority of the 
separated organization design when compared to the non-separated organization 
design. First, we see that, when balanced, the separated organization has a lower 
accumulated exploration cost and higher average knowledge when compared to the 
non-separated organization. Since the organization consists of 10 agents, each of 
them making a choice 500 times, there are a total of 5000 choices that an 
organization makes. Out of these, the separated organization exploits (chooses the 
best believed arm) about 88 percent of the time (4374 of the 5000 choices) and 
explores (does not choose the best believed arm) about 12 percent of the time (626 
choices). In contrast, the non-separated organization exploits only about 74 percent 
of the time (3678 choices) and explores about 26 percent of the time (1322 choices).  
In addition, from Table 1, we see that the separated organization explores 
more broadly. When the non-separated organization explores, 95 percent of its 
exploration is concentrated on the second (64 percent), the third (23 percent), and 
the fourth (8 percent) best believed arms out of the nine arms available; it almost 
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never chooses the worst believed arm when exploring. In contrast, the separated 
organization chooses the second (35 percent), third (13 percent) and fourth (9 
percent) arms (for a total of 57percent) much less frequently when exploring. 
Tellingly, the worst-believed arm is chosen over a non-trivial 7 percent of the 
explorations.  
This suggests that non-separated organizations explore more narrowly than 
the separated organization because of the value-sensitive exploration by every 
agent. At balance, each agent in the non-separated organization with moderately 
low temperature is susceptible to the ‘hot stove effect’, i.e., a bias against sampling 
alternatives that initially appeared unattractive (Denrell & March, 2001). 
Environmental turbulence is a source of such sampling bias, since previously 
inferior alternatives may become superior in the changed environment. The 
Bernoulli distributed payoff is another source of such sampling bias, since previous 
negative experiences with an alternative may not be a good indicator that the 
alternative is inferior, rather than the agent being initially unlucky. In these cases 
value-sensitive exploration is inefficient in converting exploration cost into 
knowledge.  
Thus Table 1 provides us with a causal mechanism to explain why the 
separated organization outperforms the non-separated organization in a turbulent 
and noisy environment. Non-stationary environments with noisy payoffs require 
two antithetical behaviors to achieve high performance: (a) more broad-based 
(value-insensitive) exploration in order to increase the organization’s knowledge 
regarding the different available alternatives (Denrell and March, 2001), and (b) 
exploiting that knowledge before the environment changes again (Posen and 
Levinthal, 2012).  
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Achieving this balance is tricky because the same organizational mechanisms 
that influence the choice between exploration and exploitation also influence the 
breadth of exploration (i.e., how value-sensitive exploration is). In the model, the 
Softmax exploration parameter (τ) determines the choice between exploration and 
exploitation as well as the breadth of exploration. When τ is low, the agent exploits 
more often than explores, and when they do explore, their exploration is narrow (or 
value-sensitive); when τ is high, agent exploration is broad (value insensitive), but 
they also tend to explore rather than exploit.  
The structural separation design allows the organization to break this trade-
off between the need for value-insensitive exploration and value-sensitive 
exploitation. In the separated design, some members with a high temperature 
explore broadly to generate knowledge about alternatives that other members with 
a very low temperature exploit to improve organizational performance. This 
combination thus allows the separated organization to convert exploration cost to 
knowledge more efficiently than the non-separated organization. The model thus 
explicitly demonstrates the mechanism underlying the hypothesis suggested by 
O’Reilly and Tushman (2013) that when faced with a disruptive change, a separated 
organization is likely to perform better than a non-separated organization. 
In the following experiments, we demonstrate that separation of exploration 
and exploitation buffers against the hot-stove effect and understand its boundary 
conditions. We demonstrate why value-sensitive exploration of individual agents is 
inefficient when the environment is turbulent (experiment 2), or the feedback is 
noisy (experiment 3), or both (experiment 4), and a separated organizational design 
is needed. Based on this mechanism, we further illustrate how a separated design 
addresses the problem of “chasing moving target” (experiment 5). 
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Experiment 2. Effect of Turbulence 
In this experiment we more clearly demonstrate the mechanism – value-
(in)sensitive search – we identified in the previous experiment as critical to 
performance in turbulent environments. Here, we simplify the baseline model to a 
20-period model with one agent per organization (in which structural separation is 
not possible). The task environment contains only 3 arms, each returns a fixed 
payoff 𝜋𝑛. When an arm is pulled, the agent instantly updates their belief based on 
the latest payoff, as each payoff is an accurate representation of the attractiveness 
of the arm. In this way, learning from the feedback is perfect, and we isolate the 
sampling problem inherent in a turbulent environment from noisy feedback. 
At the beginning, the payoffs of the three arms are 0.2, 0.0 and −0.2. A shock 
at 11th period reshapes these payoffs. We hypothesize two different shocks as shown 
in Table 2: (A) less disruptive, i.e. arm 2, the moderate arm (with 0.0 payoff), 
becomes superior after the shock; (B) more disruptive, i.e. Arm 3, the worst arm 
(with −0.2 payoff), becomes superior after the shock. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
At the beginning, the agent has perfect knowledge, i.e. his/her belief of each 
arm matches the actual payoff. However, he/she does not know whether and when 
the shock happens and how the shock will reshape the payoffs. The agent needs to 
have a right temperature or exploration propensity, 𝜏 , to balance between 
exploration and exploitation and maximize her 20-period accumulated performance.  
We plot the 20-period accumulated performance with 10,000 iterations for 
each value 𝜏 (between 0 and 0.3, with interval of 0.001) in Figure 4A and 4B (solid 
lines). With the less disruptive shock, the agent is able to balance exploration and 
exploitation by having a moderate temperature of 0.121. With the disruptive shock, 
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however, a balance could not be achieved: performance is maximized when the 
agent purely exploits (temperature 𝜏 = 0).  
In other words, value-sensitive exploration (represented by the temperature τ) 
is ineffective when environment change is disruptive, where past experience is not 
a good indication for the future. When τ is low, the agent exploits (chooses the best 
believed arm) often, and is more likely to choose Arm 2 over Arm 3 (narrow 
exploration). In contrast, when τ is high, the agent is equally likely to choose 
between the three arms (broad exploration), but does not exploit this superior 
knowledge.   
INSERT FIGURE 4A AND 4B ABOUT HERE 
This pathology can be overcome if the decision to explore is divorced from 
the breadth of exploration (which is what we suggest the separated design 
accomplishes in the baseline experiment). In Figure 4A and 4B dotted lines, we 
repeat the above experiment with such a decision rule, which we call the modified 
softmax. In this rule, the agent first follows a Softmax rule with temperature 𝜏 to 
decide whether the agent explores or exploits. If the agent exploits, he/she pulls the 
best-believed arm. If the agent decides to explore, in this rule, his/her decision is 
completely value-insensitive, and the agent pulls any of the non-best-believed arms 
with equal probability. This modified-softmax decision rule underperforms the 
value-sensitive rule (Softmax) when the shock is less disruptive (Figure 4A, dotted 
line), but it outperforms the value-sensitive rule to strike a balanced performance 
with temperature 𝜏 = 0.12 when the shock is disruptive (Figure 4B, dotted line).  
Daw and colleagues (2006) used neurological evidence to suggest that such a 
decision rule is implausible behaviorally for individuals. However, when the 
organization has multiple agents, such a decision rule could be achieved at the 
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organization level by structurally separating exploration and exploitation: by a 
combination of selection and treatment, the organization could choose exploitation 
members that are completely value sensitive, and the exploration members that are 
value insensitive. 
In addition, given the mechanism illustrated in Figure 4A and 4B, we would 
expect a separated design outperforms non-separated design when the environment 
is disruptive and the past experience is a bad indicator of current landscape; a non-
separated design outperforms separated design when environment is less disruptive 
and the past experience is still a good indicator of current landscape.  
Next, we repeat Experiment 1 by varying environment turbulence level and 
removing payoff noise (each pull returns a fixed payoff instead of a Bernoulli payoff) 
to isolate the mechanism, and compare the advantage (or disadvantage) of structural 
separation over non-separation across turbulence level27. Results, shown in Figure 
5 suggest that structural separation underperforms when the turbulence level is low, 
and outperforms when the turbulence level is high. When the turbulence level is 
very low, minimal exploration is needed, thus the difference between separated and 
non-separated designs are minimal. When the turbulence level increases, the 
advantage of non-separation mode increases and then decreases; until above a 
threshold turbulence level, after which the separation mode outperforms. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Experiment 3. Effect of Noisy Feedback 
In the previous experiment, we illustrate why structural separation 
outperforms non-separation in a turbulent environment. Strong turbulence makes 
 
27 Advantage of the structurally separated organization over the non-separated organization is 
measured as the difference between balanced performance of structurally separated 




the past experience irrelevant to the current landscape, thus a value-sensitive 
exploration based on past experience is inefficient. High levels of payoff noise can 
also make past experience a less reliable guide to future payoffs, leading to the hot-
stove effect (Denrell & March, 2001). To understand the effect of payoff noise on 
the two organization designs, again, we simplify the baseline model to a 20-period 
model with one agent per organization. The task environment contains 5 arms, each 
returns a Bernoulli payoff, with a 𝑝𝑖 success chance returning value 0.5 and 1 − 𝑝𝑖 
failure chance returning value −0.5, as shown in Table 3.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
At the beginning, the agent has unbiased beliefs of zero payoff for each arm. 
When the agent pulls an arm, he/she will experience either a success (value of 0.5) 
or a failure (value of -0.5), and he/she updates the belief using an average learning 
rule. To illustrate the mechanism, we assume the agent pulls Arm 1 – the best payoff 
arm – at the first period; now we have two possibilities: (A) the agent is lucky with 
the first pull and experiences a success; (B) the agent is unlucky with the first pull 
and experiences a failure. 
We compare the performance of the value-sensitive exploration (Softmax 
decision rule) with value-insensitive exploration (modified-Softmax decision rule) 
as stated in the previous experiment. Twenty-period accumulated performance with 
10,000 iterations for each value 𝜏 (between 0 and 0.5, with interval of 0.001) are 
plotted in Figure 6A and 6B (solid lines for Softmax, dotted lines for the modified 
Softmax). When the agent is lucky the arm is coded superior. Therefore, her best 
strategy is to always exploit under both decision rules (recall there is no turbulence) 
as shown in Figure 6A.  
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However, when unlucky, the agent forms a negative bias against the best arm, 
reducing the future sampling probability of the best arm, and leading to the hot stove 
effect (Denrell & March, 2001; March, 1996). To counter this bias, the agent needs 
to explore in an unbiased way, that is, value-insensitive. As shown in Figure 6B, 
the modified-Softmax decision rule outperforms the value-sensitive decision rule at 
peak performance. The performance of the value-sensitive decision rule is peaked 
at 𝜏 = 0.004, at which value the agent pulls the best arm 0.45 times on average 
from period 2 to period 20. The performance of the modified Softmax decision rule 
is peaked at 𝜏 = 0.097, at which value the agent pulls the best arm 1.59 times on 
average from period 2 to period 20. Therefore, separating exploration and 
exploitation – is a more effective way to reduce the hot stove effect. 
INSERT FIGURE 6A AND 6B ABOUT HERE 
These results suggest that when the payoff noise is low, that is, when past 
experiences are good indicators of the actual mean payoff of each arm, value-
sensitive decision rule of non-separation organization design outperforms the 
structurally separated design; when the payoff noise is high, that is, past experiences 
are not good indicators of the actual mean payoff of each arm subject to luck, value-
insensitive exploration by the separated organization design outperforms the non-
separated design.  
To affirm this speculation, we repeat the baseline Experiment 1 by fixing 
environment turbulence level at zero, but with Gaussian distributed payoff returns 
(instead of Bernoulli).28 We vary the payoff noise by varying the standard deviation 
of the Gaussian distribution, and compare the advantage (or disadvantage) of 
 
28 To align with the baseline model, the mean payoff of an arm is drawn from Beta(2, 2) 
distribution, minus 0.5. 
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structural separation over non-separation across different payoff noises, as shown 
in Figure 7. When the payoff noise is zero, minimal exploration is needed, thus the 
difference between separated and non-separated designs are minimal; when the 
payoff noise increases, the disadvantage of structural separation increases and then 
decreases; when the standard deviation is above 0.8, the separation design 
increasingly outperforms the non-separation design.  
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Experiment 4: Combining Environment Turbulence and Payoff Noise 
In this experiment, we combine the mechanisms from the experiment 2 and 3, 
namely bounded rationality caused by turbulence and noise. The initial mean payoff 
of each arm ?̅?𝑛,0 is drawn from a unit Gaussian distribution (mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1). At each period 𝑡, if a shock happens (with turbulence probability 𝜂), 
each arm’s mean payoff ?̅?𝑛,𝑡 has a 50% chance to be redrawn from the unit Gaussian 
distribution; otherwise, ?̅?𝑛,𝑡 = ?̅?𝑛,𝑡−1. When an arm is drawn at time t, the realized 
payoff is ?̅?𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜖 in which 𝜖 is a Gaussian distributed payoff noise with mean zero 
and standard deviation 𝜎. We systematically vary both the standard deviation of 
payoff noise 𝜎  and the environment turbulence level 𝜂 . We set 50 agents per 
organization and run the simulation for 200 periods. By identifying the right number 
of exploration agents (separated design) or the right temperature for all agents (non-
separated design), the advantage of the separated over the non-separated design at 
balance is shown in Figure 8. 
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Structural separation outperforms non-separation when the environment is 
turbulent and payoff is noisy (top-right area in Figure 8), as expected from our 
earlier discussion. In contrast, the non-separated design outperforms the separated 
98 
 
design when the environment is stable, and payoff is less noisy (bottom-left area in 
Figure 8). The advantage of non-separated design (or the disadvantage of separated 
design) is highest when both environmental turbulence and payoff noise are 
moderate.  
When both payoff noise and turbulence are low, the agents are almost 
perfectly rational and minimal exploration is needed, thus there is little difference 
between the separated and non-separated designs. When payoff noise and 
turbulence increase, rationality becomes more bounded and exploration is needed 
to realign the experience-based beliefs and the reality. However, when noise and 
turbulence are moderate, past experiences are still good indicators of reality, thus 
value-sensitive exploration of the non-separated design prevails. When noise and 
turbulence are high, past experiences are no longer good indicators of reality, thus 
value-insensitive exploration of separated design prevails. This finding formalizes 
the intuition behind O’Reilly and Tushman’s (2013) proposition that structurally 
separating exploration and exploitation is necessary when the organization faces 
disruptive change, and extends it to include cases of high feedback noise. 
 
Discussion 
Though it is well accepted that superior performance entails achieving a 
balance between exploration and exploitation, questions remain about how exactly 
organizations should go about achieving such a balance. Exploitation is defined as 
the choice to perform actions that are currently known to have superior payoffs; 
formally, exploitation is modelled as the agent choosing the action that is currently 
believed to return the highest payoff. Exploration is defined as the choice to perform 
an action that is currently believed to be inferior, in order to learn more about its 
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true properties (March, 1996); formally, exploration is modelled as the agent 
choosing an alternative that is currently believed to return a lower payoff than the 
‘exploitation’ option. Unlike exploitation (which is value-sensitive by definition), 
exploration can be value sensitive or value insensitive – i.e., when the agent explores, 
how likely is it to choose an option that is currently believed to be almost as good 
the current exploitation choice (narrow or value-sensitive exploration) versus a 
choice that is currently believed to be truly awful (broad or value-insensitive 
exploration).  
When the environment is turbulent and/or payoff is noisy, choices that were 
previously poorly performing may now perform better; thus knowledge based on 
past experience may not be a good indicator of the reality. Superior organizational 
performance under these conditions requires both (1) broad (value-insensitive) 
exploration to gain new knowledge, and (2) swift (value-sensitive) exploitation to 
use knowledge before the environment changes again. These two activities are 
difficult to reconcile since they build on different assumptions about knowledge: 
the former assumes that knowledge built from past experience does not reflect 
reality and has little value, whereas the latter assumes that knowledge built from 
past experience accurately reflects reality and therefore valuable.  
Individuals are constrained in meeting these competing requirements: their 
behaviour does not shift seamlessly between being completely value-insensitive (as 
required by the first assumption) to completely value-sensitive (as required by the 
second assumption) and back (Daw et al, 2006). It is for this reason that current 
formal work does not distinguish between the decision to explore and the breadth 
of exploration as two distinct decision variables. For example, in the Softmax 
algorithm (Luce, 1959; Camerer and Hua Ho, 1999), that is frequently used to 
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model agent choice behaviour, a single parameter, the temperature τ, regulates both 
the propensity to explore (vs. exploit) and the breadth of exploration. When τ is low, 
the agent explores less frequently, and its exploration is value-sensitive. When τ is 
high, the agent explores often, and its exploration is value-insensitive.  
Behavioural experiments suggests that the softmax rule better predicts actual 
human behaviour when compared to the value-insensitive exploration rule (Daw et 
al, 2006; also see Cohen, McClure and Yu, 2007; Gans, Knox and Croson, 2007; 
Knox et al, 2012; Weber, Shafir and Blais, 2004; please also see discussion in Posen 
and Levinthal, 2012, p590 and Puranam et al, 2015). This is likely true of 
individuals in organizations as well, as social structures such as incentives, authority, 
culture, and socialization, encourage either (broad) exploration or exploitation, but 
not both. This propensity for individuals in organizations to either explore or exploit 
is well recognized and forms the basic behavioural assumption underlying the 
literature on ambidexterity. Thus, the behaviour assumed by the value-insensitive 
exploration rule (e.g. ε-greedy rule, Sutton and Barto, 1998), when agents are 
completely value sensitive, except when they explore with a small probability ε 
when they are completely value-insensitive, is unlikely to describe the behaviour of 
human agents in organizations (please see discussion in Adler et al, 2009; Benner 
and Tushman, 2003; 2015; Shalley and Gilson, 2017 on the broader topic of 
employees simultaneously exploring and exploiting).  
What is often not as well recognized, especially in formal work, is that 
organizations are collectives of human agents, and therefore, the organization has 
an “extra degree of freedom” when compared to individuals. This can be utilized to 
achieve a design such that the organization as a whole, rather than its individual 
parts, balances exploration and exploitation activities. In this case, one unit within 
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the organization is highly value-sensitive and exploits current knowledge, whereas 
another unit is value-insensitive, explores broadly and accrues knowledge. Whereas 
the separated organization effectively utilizes this additional degree of freedom, the 
non-separated organization does not. Therefore, the separated organization 
performs better in situations that require exploitation to be coupled with broad 
(value-insensitive) exploration, and the non-separated organization performs better 
in situations that require exploitation to be coupled with narrow (value-sensitive) 
exploration. In this sense, adopting a richer multi-agent modelling framework 
allows us to ask questions and arrive at different predictions from typical unitary-
agent models, thus contributing to forward formal work on the exploration-
exploitation trade-off.  
Our results thus formally replicate the intuition presented by O’Reilly and 
Tushman (2013), who argue that separation mode for achieving ambidexterity is 
likely superior to the contextual mode when environments are changing radically 
(also see Benner and Tushman, 2015). We add to prior work by formalizing the 
mechanism – we show that the ambidexterity problem comes in two distinct 
flavours: (a) the tension between pursuing value-insensitive exploration along with 
exploitation and (b) the tension of pursuing value-sensitive exploration along with 
exploitation (which is always value-sensitive). We argue that the first problem is 
more difficult to solve than the second problem, and show that different 
organization designs are optimal under these conditions. The non-separation design 
is ineffective in the first instance because it is more prone to the hot-stove effect 
(Denrell & March, 2001) in noisy environments and to the ‘chasing a moving target’ 
problem in turbulent environments (Posen & Levinthal, 2012). In contrast, the 
separation design is effective, but inefficient in the second instance.  
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In addition, our study proposes the following additional insights. First, we 
show that the same tension inherent in turbulent environments is also inherent in 
noisy environments, where prior outcomes are not indicative of the true potential of 
the arms. For example, consider the pharmaceutical industry, where the success or 
failure of drug programs (such as statins or beta-blockers) cannot be reliably 
identified from the success of individual drugs (such as Lipitor or Lopressor). We 
also show that the effects of noise and turbulence are super-additive, and thus 
broaden the context for adopting structural ambidexterity from what was known in 
prior work.  
Second, we identify scenarios where contextual ambidexterity is inherently 
superior, another point of contention in prior work. We show that when turbulence 
or noise are moderate, the separated organization under-performs the non-separated 
organization. We note that in highly stable environments, there is almost no 
difference between separation-mode versus non-separation mode, which is different 
from intuition. More interestingly, we show that the non-separation mode 
increasingly outperforms the separation mode when turbulence and noise increase, 
until some threshold after which the effect reverses. Unlike prior work that does not 
speculate about whether one these modes of ambidexterity is superior, or whether 
they are simply equi-final under less turbulent conditions, we show that the non-
separated organization is actually superior. We also show that this superiority 
comes not from coordination problems inherent in structural separation (they are 
absent by design in our model), but because value-sensitive exploration is a superior 
strategy for adaptation in these environments. Indeed, the superiority of contextual 
mode is likely to be broader than suggested here, to the extent that coordination 
problems in the separation mode are pervasive and difficult to solve.  
103 
 
Third, we are more precise about the effects of ‘change’. Change can be 
radical – i.e., arms that were previously believed to be truly inferior (rather than 
slightly inferior) can become superior, or change can be turbulent – i.e., the nature 
of the arms fluctuate, without significant reordering of the belief structure, or both. 
Our results suggest that separation mode is only superior in steady state when there 
is radical and turbulent change; in fact, non-separation mode is superior when 
change is turbulent, but not radical. This is because value-insensitive exploration is 
only useful when there is radical change. Note that in many of our experiments, 
similar to Posen and Levinthal (2012), the higher the turbulence, the more likely it 
is coupled with radical change. In experiment 2 and 4, we specifically decouple 
radical change from turbulence, and show that separation is only truly superior 
when there is radical change (in a computational model, the effects of radical change 
with no turbulence are washed away at steady state, and can only be witnessed in a 
time-limited model as in experiments 2 and 3).  
Finally, our predictions for the ‘chasing a moving target’ problem differ from 
those by Posen and Levinthal (2012). They predict that when environments are 
highly turbulent, the better strategy is to exploit, since the knowledge gained from 
exploration is fleeting. They argue that as turbulence increases, optimal exploration 
strategy follows an ‘inverted-U’ shaped pattern, which we reproduce in the non-
separation design. However, their unitary actor model suffers from the lack of 
degrees of freedom as argued before. Correcting for this, we show that it is better 
for the organization to devote more (not less) resources to exploring as the 
environment changes rapidly, where value insensitive exploration is paired with 
exploitation in the separation design. Thus, the pattern of optimal resource 
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allocation to exploration activities with increasing turbulence is different across 
these designs.  
Limitations and Conclusions 
The study is subject to a few important limitations. First, our modelling 
approach builds on existing behavioural research, especially on experimental 
findings regarding how individuals explore versus exploit, as opposed to calibrating 
to observed real-world data and offering a potential mechanism to explain them. 
Each modeling approach has its strengths and weaknesses, and we believe that the 
core research question explored here matches the modelling approach that we have 
chosen, but other modeling approaches to this question may produce different 
insights. Our approach is aligned with much prior work in organization theory on 
balancing exploration and exploitation (Bauman et al, 2018; Denrell and March, 
2001; Lee and Puranam, 2016; Posen and Levinthal, 2012). Second, we abstract 
away from how individual beliefs are formed in order to focus on the research 
question of interest here, which is the influence of the different organization designs 
on ambidexterity, though we relax some of our assumptions in robustness. Future 
work should consider a more rigorous treatment of belief formation with the 
different designs and using various integration mechanisms.   
Despite these limitations, our study contributes to the literature in several 
ways in teasing out the contingencies under which different modes of achieving 
ambidexterity are superior. One other strength of this study is that we examine 
differences in performance when these different modes of ambidexterity are at 
“balance”, allowing us to side-step the thorny issue of tautology in this literature, 
where balance is defined as the state at which maximum performance is reached 
(Raisch et al, 2009). By using a formal approach we also throw light on the 
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underlying mechanisms, which may not always be feasible in empirical studies, 
especially with a construct such as ambidexterity which has been applied at multiple 
levels of analysis and with widely different empirical operationalizations (cf: Junni 
et al, 2013).  
Our formal results are aligned with broad empirical patterns. For example, 
firms with a more decentralized R&D structure, where the same units are more 
likely to be tasked with future products as well as current improvements, generate 
fewer patents and these patents have lower technical impact (cf: Argyres & 
Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2011, 2014). In contrast, firms with a 
more centralized R&D structure, generate innovation that draws from wider range 
of technologies, and has larger subsequent impact (Argyres & Silverman, 2004). 
Integration barriers, based on product scope (Arora et al., 2014), geography (Singh, 
2008), lack of social capital (Monteiro & Birkinshaw, 2017), or clash of incentives 
(Bercovitz & Feldman, 2007), however, remain an important liability of pursuing 
ambidexterity using the separated mode. 
The findings derived from our theoretical model have interesting managerial 
implications. Consider the example of Alphabet. The industry environment it 
operates in is highly dynamic today. In addition, Alphabet now has projects (e.g. 
Waymo, Project Loon) that are risky and uncertain. Yet it also operates in 
businesses (e.g. search engine and advertisement) that generate stable revenues. 
Conducting explorative projects in dedicated subsidiaries and separating them from 
revenue generating activities buffer the bias against those risky and uncertain 
projects that may fail initially. Thus, the company adopted the separation mode, 
moving away from the non-separated approach by dropping the 80-20 policy 
(Schrage, 2013; Zenger, 2015). In contrast, for a firm such as 3M that operates in 
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the more stable technology regime employing chemistry, a non-separated design, 
where employees pursue their favourite projects some percent of their time appears 
to be optimal.  
This also suggests that perhaps some of the solutions applied to the problem of 
central R&D are misguided. The point of separating exploration into a central 
R&D unit is to allow it to explore truly novel alternatives, especially those 
considered of no value currently. Forcing incentive schemes on central R&D to be 
responsive to divisions and their current commercial needs, in effect, neuters the 
very purpose of central R&D. No doubt coordination problems exist between 
central R&D and the divisions. As Tushman and colleagues have argued (Smith & 
Tushman, 2005; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996), it is the job of senior management to 
achieve an overall collaborative structure across these specialized units. Side-
stepping this responsibility and empowering divisions to direct how resources are 
allocated in the central R&D is likely to not be the appropriate solution, since it 
pushes the specialized exploration unit to become more value-sensitive in its 
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ESSAY C: Responding to two levels of feedback: evidence from professional 
basketball teams 
Introduction 
Decades of research has shown how organizations respond to performance 
feedback. Drawing insights from the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF), 
empirical evidences have been documented about a variety of organizational 
responses to performance feedback: organizational change (Greve, 2003; Park, 
2007; Chen and Miller 2007), risk taking (Bromiley, 1991; Miller and Leiblein, 
1996; Kim and Rhee, 2017) and new product introduction (Gaba and Joseph, 2013). 
However, there is little known about how organizations respond to overall 
organizational performance feedback and performance feedback of different 
strategic options.  
The importance of this research question comes in three folds. First, 
organizational response to the overall performance can be fine-grained into 
responses to feedback about different strategic options. Posen and his colleagues 
(2018) call for a disentanglement of how alternatives are evaluated to understand 
the black box of organizational responses to performance feedback. Spontaneously 
analyzing organizational response to the overall performance and feedback from 
strategic options could uncover the underlying mechanisms. Second, organizations 
often pursue multiple strategic options at the same time, e.g. diversification, 
strategic alliances, or internationalization, in the form of online search. Therefore, 
organizations need to respond to a lower level of performance feedback from a 
strategic option and a higher level of performance feedback of the organization. 
Third, the line of literature on performance response implicitly assumes the 
unambiguous nature of performance feedback, despite the tradition of emphasis on 
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bounded rationality arising from ambiguity and adaptation in response to such 
ambiguity (March and Simon, 1958; March, 2010; March and Olsen, 1976). Recent 
research has highlighted the importance of relaxing the assumption of unambiguous 
performance feedback. One stream of literature suggests unambiguous performance 
can be interpreted ambiguously relative to different aspirations, e.g. historical vs. 
social aspiration (Joseph and Gaba, 2015; Baum, et al. 2005). The other stream of 
literature suggests feedback ambiguity arises from the task environment, e.g. noise, 
uncertainty (Posen & Levinthal, 2012), delay (Rahmandad, 2008; Fang and 
Levinthal, 2009). The divergence between the performance feedback from a 
strategic option and the overall organizational performance can be another source 
of feedback ambiguity, yet unstudied. 
Based on attribution theory (Weiner, 1974), this paper proposes that 
organizations and organizational members tend to attribute organizational success 
to internal factors for self-enhancement motivation, and attribute organizational 
failure to external factors for self-protection motivation (Kelley and Michela, 1980). 
Thus, a negative feedback of overall failure will trigger the attribution towards 
external factors that are beyond the organization’s control, weakening the 
organization’s response to the internal feedback of strategic options. 
Using the professional basketball data, I examine how organizations respond 
to multi-level performance feedback by resource allocation. Specifically, I examine 
how basketball teams respond to players’ performance and the teams’ performance 
in terms of allocation of playing time, a scarce resource to the teams. Allocation of 
playing time to players not only reflects a team’s strategy to the game, but also 
serves as an online search for better performing options (players). I find that the 
playing time allocated to a player is positively associated with the player’s previous 
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game performance. The positive relationship between the playing time allocated to 
a player and the player’s performance feedback is weakened (strengthened) if the 
team experiences a loss (win), suggesting basketball teams attribute team success 
to the performance of its players, while attribute failure to it less. Align with this 
argument, I also find that, when the team experiences a blow-out loss, the effect of 
failure attribution is the strongest and the response to internal feedback is the 
weakest. The findings of this paper provide a new perspective for BTOF especially 
when organization receives multiple performance feedback at different levels. It 
also provides a micro-mechanism on how organizations respond to organizational 
success and failure. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The allocation of resources responds to prior performance feedback reflects a 
learning process (Levitt & March 1988). Organizations and their members try to 
identify the superior strategic option by online search and allocate resources 
accordingly. If resources allocated to a strategic option receive a positive 
performance feedback, the feedback indicates the strategic option desirable, and 
more resources should be allocated to this option subsequently. With the 
assumption of resource scarcity, resources will also be divested from options that 
receive negative performance feedback, such that these resources could be 
reallocated to the better performing options. This learning and resource 
allocation/reallocation process of an organization could find its behavioral root 
from an individual’s heuristic learning strategies such as “win-stay-lose-switch” 
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Worthy, Hawthorne & Otto, 2013) and “hot-hand” 
(Gans, Knox & Croson, 2007). 
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In the context of professional basketball teams, the coaches and managers 
need to allocate the scarce and valuable resource of playing time among the 
players. Allocating playing time to the better performing players is critical to the 
overall success of the team. Coaches and managers learn from, and react to, the 
latest performance of players on a game-to-game basis.  
Proposition 1: The amount of resource allocated to a strategic option 
is positively related to the option’s previous performance. 
Hypothesis 1: The minutes allocated to a player in a game is 
positively related to the player’s previous game performance. 
Organizations also learn from the organizational performance feedback, 
namely, organizational successes and failures. Understanding how organizational 
performance interacts with lower-level performance feedback about strategic 
options could uncover underlying mechanism of how organizations learn from 
performance feedback. Prior literature has shown mixed empirical results on 
whether organizations learn more from organizational successes or from 
organizational failures. In some cases, organizations (and individuals) learn more 
from success (Baum and Dahlin, 2007; KC, et al., 2013); in other cases, 
organizations learn more from failure (Li and Rajagopalan, 1997; Madsen and 
Desai, 2010). However, these research does not directly examine the mechanisms 
leading to their predictions. The interaction between organizational performance 
and performance of strategic options provides a pathway. 
Attribution theory (Kelley and Michela, 1980) predicts that individuals tend 
to attribute failures to uncontrollable external factors while attribute success to 
internal factors of themselves. Such attribution is driven by individuals’ motivation 
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to preserve self-image: success has the potential for the enhancement of self-esteem, 
thus attributing success to internal and controllable factors of oneself serves the 
motivation for self-enhancement; failure has the potential for negative implication 
for self-regard unless causal responsibility is attributed externally, thus attributing 
failure to external and uncontrollable factors serves the motivation for self-
protection. Consequently, how success and failure are attributed will also influence 
the subsequent response: when attribution is directed internally towards 
controllable factors such as effort and learning, motivation for subsequent response 
will be stronger than when attribution is directed externally to factors such as luck. 
Organizations, as a collective of organizational members, are not free from 
such attribution bias. Resource allocation between strategic options can be viewed 
as an internal factor within the organizational control. When the organization 
experiences an organizational failure, the organization and its members such as 
executives and managers will attribute the failure to external factors rather than the 
effectiveness of resource allocation between options. The organizational members 
will self-justify that, the resource allocation has little to do with the failure, and the 
performance feedback of the strategic options has little meaning for the 
organizational performance. Following this justification, the organization would 
respond little to the performance feedback of the strategic options. In contrast, when 
organization experiences an organization success, the organization and its members 
will attribute the success to the strategic resource allocation, especially those 
strategic options with better performance feedback. The organizational members 
will therefore respond more to the performance feedback of strategic options and 
allocate more resources to the better-performing options. 
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In the context of professional basketball teams, attribution theory suggests 
that when a team experiences a success / failure, the coach and manager will 
attribute the success / failure towards internal / external factors. That means, if a 
team experiences a win / loss, the team will respond more / less to its players’ 
performance feedback in terms of minutes allocated to the players as predicted in 
Hypothesis 1.  
Proposition 2. The positive relationship (in P1) between the amount of 
resource allocated to a strategic option and the option’s prior performance, 
is stronger / weaker if the organization experienced prior success / failure. 
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship (in H1) between the minutes 
allocated to a player and the player’s previous game performance, is 
positively / negatively moderated by the team’s previous game win / loss. 
 
Following the logic of attribution bias, when an organization experiences a 
strong organizational failure (e.g. large distance from aspiration), the 
organizational members will face more negative implication of self-regard, thus 
they may attribute the failure even less to the resource allocation, thus respond 
less to the performance feedback from strategic options. In contrast, when an 
organization experience a strong organization success (e.g. large distance from 
aspiration), the organizational members will have stronger motivation to attribute 
the success to the prior strategic action, including resource allocation, thus 
respond more to the performance feedback from strategic options. That means, 
the moderation effect of organizational performance feedback on the relationship 
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between resource allocation response and prior performance will be enhanced if 
the success or failure is stronger. 
In the context of basketball teams, when a team experiences a blow-out 
success over the opponent, the team and its coach / manager will attribute the 
success more to internal factors, including the performance of its players, thus 
the team will respond more to the players’ performance. In contrast, when a team 
experiences a blow-out defeat by the opponent, the team will attribute the failure 
less to the internal factor, thus respond less to the players’ performance. 
Proposition 3. The moderation effect (in P2) of organizational prior 
success / failure on the relationship between a strategic option’s allocated 
resource and prior performance, is strengthened if the organization 
experience strong prior success / failure. 
Hypothesis 3. The moderation effect (in H2) of the team’s previous game 
win / loss on the relationship between a player’s allocated minutes and 
his previous game performance, is stronger if the team’s previous win or 
loss is big. That is,  
H3(a) The positive relationship between a player’s allocated minutes 
and his previous game performance is stronger if the team won the 
previous game and the score difference is large. 
H3(b) The positive relationship between a player’s allocated minutes 
and his previous game performance is weaker if the team lost the 




Method and data 
To test the above hypotheses, I use longitudinal data of National 
Basketball Association (NBA) from the 2000/2001 to the 2015/2016 regular 
season, captured from basketball-reference.com. Basketball teams receive 
performance feedback following each game: the team receives overarching 
organizational feedback as wins or losses, as the primary goal of any 
competitive sports is to win; meanwhile the team also receives feedback 
regarding the player’s on-court performance, in the form of player statistics. 
The teams will need to adjust the allocation of playing minutes, an important 
strategic resource to the team (Staw & Hoang, 1995; Ertug and Maoret, 2019; 
Zhang, 2017), among the players for a better subsequent team performance. 
Analyzing behavioral response to performance feedback of an organization (a 
team) and a strategic option (a player) in the setting of professional basketball 
teams have several empirical advantages. Firstly, the same teams’ and the 
players’ performance are available to both the teams and to the researcher. 
Second, playing minutes of a team, as an important strategic resource, is 
consistent across teams: a team could only allocate the playing minutes to 5 
players for 48 minutes in each game. This setting avoids additional resources 
such as slack accumulated from prior organizational success. Third, 
organizational success and failure are clearly defined as win and loss in each 
basketball game. Fourth, the chance of organizational success and failure, in the 
form of wins and losses, are equal to 0.5 across the overall population of teams. 
This setting avoids situations in which successes and failures are extremely rare, 
yet way more impactful than the common experiences – e.g. in high reliability 
organizations such as air traffic controls and nuclear power plants, a failure 
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could be disastrous and catastrophic, containing more information for learning 
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007). 
I gathered a sample of 386,431 player-game observations to test H1A and 
H1B. I exclude each NBA team’s first game of each season as there is no 
performance feedback from prior game of that season. 
Dependent variables 
For H1, H2 and H3, I use a player’s playing time (minutes) in a game as 
the dependent variable. It is a valuable organizational resource that the teams 
possess. A team divides the playing time among the players, and having the best 
players on court helps winning. For games with overtime, the players’ minutes 
are scaled such that the total game length is constantly 48 minutes. 
Independent variables and moderators 
I use a players’ previous game relative efficiency per 48 minutes as his 
previous game performance. As suggested by NBA official website, efficiency 
is used by NBA coaches to “evaluate a player’s game performance”, and is 
calculated as combination of a players’ basic game statistics such as points, 
rebounds, assist, field goals made and missed, turnovers, etc. A player’s 
efficiency is divided by his playing minutes in the game and times 48 minutes 
to form efficiency per 48 minutes, and then the efficiency per 48 minutes of the 
players of the same team in a game is standardized using z-score to form relative 
efficiency per 48 minutes. This measure of performance is highly correlated with 
other similar measure such as relative PER (0.84) and Game Score per 48 
minutes (0.92).  
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The team’s previous game win (loss) is used as the moderator for H2. The 
absolute final score difference in the previous game is used as the moderator for 
H3. 
Controls 
Following prior literature (Staw & Hoang, 1995; Zhang, 2017), variables 
are control at both team and player level. At team level, I control whether the 
game is a home game, the team’s past win-loss records, the number of games 
the team has played, whether the focal team is from the Western Conference, 
and whether the focal team and the opponent are from the same conference. At 
the player level, I control the personal fouls per 48 minutes this game, years in 
the league (squared) , years with the team (logged), years of collaboration with 
the coach (logged), and whether the player is a defensive player. I also used 
year-player fixed effect to control unobserved variables at year and player level. 
Results 
Table 1 provides summary statistics and correlations for the variables. 
Table. Table 2 present the results for models predicting a player’s allocated 
minutes. Model 2 suggests a player’s previous game performance has a positive 
and significant effect (p<0.001) on the playing time allocated to him this game, 
supporting H1. Model 3 adds the moderating effect from previous game win. 
The team’s previous game win positively and significantly moderates (p<0.001) 
the effect of player’s previous game performance on his playing time this game, 
supporting H2. Figure 1 illustrate the moderating effect using the coefficient 
from Model 2. The figure shows the teams responds to individual player’s 
previous performance more strongly when the previous game was a won, than 
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when the previous game was a loss. Figure 1 also shows that when teams 
experience failure, their unresponsiveness to performance feedback is not 
reflected in allocating less minutes to the better performing players. Rather, they 
do not divest resources from the poor performing players. This observation is 
an indirect evidence that the teams tend to not attribute poor team performance 
to poor performing team members. 
Model 4 and 5 illustrate the moderation effect based on subsample. Model 
4 illustrate the subsample of previous win and model 5 illustrate the subsample 
of previous loss. The coefficient of players’ previous game performance is 
significant higher when the previous game won. 
==Insert Table 1 and 2; Figure 1 and 2 about here== 
Model 6 of Table 2 illustrate the three-way interaction between player’s 
performance feedback, team’s performance feedback, and absolute score 
difference. The coefficient of the three-way interaction is significant (p<0.001), 
supporting H3. For better understanding, Model 7 and 8 break down the 
subsample based on previous game win / loss. In Model 7 with the subsample 
of previous game won, the interaction between player’s previous performance 
and previous game absolute score difference is not significant, not supporting 
H3A. In model 8 with the subsample of previous game lost, the interaction 
between player’s previous performance and previous game absolute score 
difference is significant (p<0.001), supporting H3B. The three-way interaction 
is further illustrated in Figure 2. We can see that the minutes allocation response 
to the player’s previous game performance is significantly weaker (flatter) when 
the team experience a loss in the previous game, and the score difference is large. 
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As the data from basketball-reference.com does not contain player’s 
inaction (did not play, or DNP) due to coach’s decision prior to 2013-14 season, 
our results may be flawed due to sampling bias. I also run a sub-sample analysis 
based on 2013-14 to 2015-16 season, the results are robust. 
Discussion 
Prior research in BTOF focuses on the organizations’ behavioral 
responses to organizational performance feedback. Attainment discrepancy 
arises following failures or performance below aspiration, leading to 
problematic search with the motivation to close the performance gap in response 
(Gary et al, 2017), creating opportunities for awareness, learning and 
improvements (Madsen and Desai, 2010). In contrast to these arguments, this 
research contributes to the literature in two ways. First, organizations may 
receive performance feedback at different levels, rather than a single 
overarching performance feedback. Specifically, organization’s response to the 
overall performance feedback and the feedback of strategic options may be 
intertwined, affecting how these feedbacks are attributed, interpreted and 
responded. By investigating how the alternative strategic options are evaluated 
and resources are allocated, conjecture to the organizational performance 
feedback, this research unveils the black box of organization response to 
performance feedback. Particularly, this research demonstrates the mechanism 
why organizations may learn less and respond less from failures, in support of 
prior empirical findings (KC, et al, 2013; Baum & Dahlin, 2007). That is, 
organizations tend to not attribute organizational failures to poor performing 
strategic options, and reluctant to divest resources from these options. 
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Second, prior literature also suggested that the motivation to close 
performance gap may lead to adjustment of aspiration. This research shows that 
the motivation of self-protection leads to adjustment of how failure is attributed. 
The possibility of attributing performance feedback between two levels of 
performance feedback give rises to bounded rationality due to attribution error 
(Foss & Webber, 2016). This argument could also provide alternative 
explanation to management phenomena. For example, a diversified company 
received different performance feedback from different business units and an 
overarching organizational performance feedback. When the company receives 
a negative organizational performance feedback, the managers may attribute the 
failure externally rather than internally towards the underperforming units, and 
are reluctant to divest these units and concentrate resources to the better 
performing units. In contrast, for an undiversified company with a single (or a 
limited number of) business unit(s), the organizational performance feedback is 
identical to the performance of the business unit(s), thus it is difficult for the 
managers to direct the organization failure away from the business unit’s failure, 
forcing the managers to respond. This could be an explanation to diversification 
discount.  
Although NBA basketball data provides me a detailed context, there are 
several limitations requiring further studies. Although coaches and managers 
face pressure from underperformance, NBA teams do not face elimination from 
the league. In addition, teams with low performance will purposely “tank”, or 
seek loses, such that they will get better rookie picks for the next season. In a 
more competitive environment with little tolerance for failure, organizations 
may respond differently to organizational failure. Secondly, as mentioned above, 
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the minutes allocation in a team reflects a diversified organization with 
spontaneous pursue of multiple online search, giving opportunity for attribution 
error. The size of available strategic option space, or the level of diversification, 
could be a boundary condition. Our findings offer a call for future work to 





List of Tables for Essay C 
Table 1: Correlation table – player-game level 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Player's allocated minutes 23.47 11.51 0.00 48.00 1.000 
            
2 Player's previous game 
performance 
0.03 0.92 -3.46 3.44 0.204 1.000 
           
3 Previous game win 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.011 0.006 1.000 
          
4 Previous game absolute 
score difference 
10.79 7.75 1.00 55.00 0.004 0.007 0.003 1.000 
         
5 Team's past win-loss 
record this season 
0.50 0.19 0.00 1.00 -0.017 0.001 0.375 0.008 1.000 
        
6 Team's game number this 
season 
41.40 23.29 2.00 82.00 0.017 -0.003 0.002 0.010 0.006 1.000 
       
7 Player's fouls per 48 min 
this game 
5.00 5.52 0.00 192.00 -0.274 -0.020 -0.011 -0.001 -0.012 -0.017 1.000 
      
8 Player's years in the 
league 
5.13 4.24 0.00 31.00 0.112 0.024 0.059 0.005 0.156 -0.023 -0.059 1.000 
     
9 Player's years with the 
team (log) 
0.72 0.70 0.00 3.00 0.292 0.128 0.059 0.007 0.159 -0.020 -0.074 0.256 1.000 
    
10 Defensive player 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.173 0.085 -0.004 -0.001 -0.010 0.000 0.175 -0.075 -0.016 1.000 
   
11 Player's year of 
collaboration with coach 
(log) 
3.71 1.25 0.00 7.08 0.239 0.080 0.078 0.003 0.184 -0.012 -0.056 0.020 0.300 -0.007 1.000 
  
12 Team is from West 
Conference 
0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.006 -0.001 0.055 0.010 0.163 0.000 -0.006 0.002 0.034 0.006 0.058 1.000 
 
13 Both team from the same 
conference 




Table 2: Fixed-effect OLS on a player’s playing time (minutes) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Full Full 
      
Player's previous game performance (H1)  0.961*** 
  (0.0306) 
Previous game win   
   




Previous game absolute score difference   
   
Player's previous game performance*Previous game 
absolute score difference (H3A/3B) 
  
  




Player's previous game performance*Previous game 
win*Previous game absolute score difference (H3) 
  
  
Team's past win-loss record this season -5.832*** -5.704*** 
 (0.391) (0.384) 
Team's game number this season 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 
 (0.00141) (0.00139) 
Player's fouls per 48 min this game -0.307*** -0.306*** 
 (0.00774) (0.00764) 
Player's years in the league (squared) -0.0881*** -0.0854*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0189) 
Player's years with the team (log) 1.685*** 1.630*** 
 (0.180) (0.176) 
Defensive player -2.207*** -2.186*** 
 (0.349) (0.345) 
Player's year of collaboration with coach (log) 0.556*** 0.548*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0337) 
Team is from Western Conference -0.487** -0.445* 
 (0.241) (0.237) 
Both team from the same conference 0.0755*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0272) 
Constant 29.45*** 29.27*** 
 (0.983) (0.962) 
   
Season and player fixed effect Yes Yes 
Clustered std. err. on players Yes Yes 
Observations 386,431 386,431 
R-squared 0.484 0.489 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Fixed-effect OLS on a player’s playing time (minutes) – cont’ 
  (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Full Previous Win Previous Loss 
        
Player's previous game performance (H1) 0.826*** 1.075*** 0.832*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0394) (0.0317) 
Previous game win -0.297***   
 (0.0287)   
Player's previous game performance*Previous game 
win (H2) 
0.276***   
(0.0355)   
Previous game absolute score difference    
    
Player's previous game performance*Previous game 
absolute score difference (H3A/3B) 
   
   
Previous game win*Previous game absolute score 
difference 
   
   
Player's previous game performance*Previous game 
win*Previous game absolute score difference (H3) 
   
   
Team's past win-loss record this season -5.408*** -5.940*** -5.501*** 
 (0.390) (0.434) (0.420) 
Team's game number this season 0.0135*** 0.00252* 0.0240*** 
 (0.00139) (0.00139) (0.00181) 
Player's fouls per 48 min this game -0.306*** -0.288*** -0.323*** 
 (0.00764) (0.00824) (0.00854) 
Player's years in the league (squared) -0.0853*** -0.0874*** -0.0833*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0194) (0.0187) 
Player's years with the team (log) 1.627*** 1.629*** 1.640*** 
 (0.175) (0.180) (0.181) 
Defensive player -2.184*** -2.041*** -2.340*** 
 (0.344) (0.367) (0.347) 
Player's year of collaboration with coach (log) 0.549*** 0.517*** 0.573*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0360) (0.0371) 
Team is from Western Conference -0.445* -0.396 -0.439* 
 (0.237) (0.254) (0.235) 
Both team from the same conference 0.0788*** 0.0908** 0.0625 
 (0.0272) (0.0390) (0.0381) 
Constant 29.26*** 30.23*** 28.37*** 
 (0.961) (1.091) (0.876) 
    
Season and player fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered std. err. on players Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 386,431 194,259 192,110 
R-squared 0.490 0.519 0.467 




Table 2: Fixed-effect OLS on a player’s playing time (minutes) – cont’ 
  (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Full Previous Win Previous Loss 
        
Player's previous game performance (H1) 1.040*** 1.043*** 1.048*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0472) (0.0484) 
Previous game win 0.129***   
 (0.0487)   
Player's previous game performance*Previous game 
win (H2) 
0.0303   
(0.0506)   
Previous game absolute score difference 0.0244*** -0.0166*** 0.0229*** 
 (0.00273) (0.00268) (0.00269) 
Player's previous game performance*Previous game 
absolute score difference (H3A/3B) 
-0.0198*** 0.00314 -0.0200*** 
(0.00301) (0.00255) (0.00300) 
Previous game win*Previous game absolute score 
difference 
-0.0409***   
(0.00399)   
Player's previous game performance*Previous game 
win*Previous game absolute score difference (H3) 
0.0229***   
(0.00398)   
Team's past win-loss record this season -5.325*** -5.867*** -5.406*** 
 (0.389) (0.432) (0.418) 
Team's game number this season 0.0134*** 0.00266* 0.0238*** 
 (0.00139) (0.00139) (0.00180) 
Player's fouls per 48 min this game -0.306*** -0.288*** -0.323*** 
 (0.00763) (0.00823) (0.00854) 
Player's years in the league (squared) -0.0853*** -0.0874*** -0.0832*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0194) (0.0186) 
Player's years with the team (log) 1.626*** 1.630*** 1.637*** 
 (0.175) (0.180) (0.181) 
Defensive player -2.181*** -2.039*** -2.337*** 
 (0.344) (0.367) (0.346) 
Player's year of collaboration with coach (log) 0.550*** 0.518*** 0.575*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0360) (0.0371) 
Team is from Western Conference -0.443* -0.392 -0.440* 
 (0.237) (0.254) (0.235) 
Both team from the same conference 0.0827*** 0.0952** 0.0661* 
 (0.0273) (0.0391) (0.0380) 
Constant 28.95*** 30.36*** 28.07*** 
 (0.958) (1.093) (0.873) 
    
Season and player fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered std. err. on players Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 386,431 194,259 192,110 
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Figure 1: Performance feedback’s effect on subsequent minutes allocation, 
moderated by previous success (H2). Coefficients based on Table 2 model 3 


































Figure 2: Player’s allocated minutes, three-way interaction between player’s 
performance feedback, team’s performance feedback, and absolute score 
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